Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 36

Issue 3

Article 1

4-1-2020

JUDGING EQUIVALENTS
Lim, Daryl

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lim, Daryl, JUDGING EQUIVALENTS, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 223 (2020).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol36/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of Santa Clara
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com, pamjadi@scu.edu.

JUDGING EQUIVALENTS
By Daryl Lim1
Courts, patent attorneys, and legal scholars have wrestled with
operationalizing the doctrine of equivalents for nearly 150 years. A venerable
exception to normal patent infringement rules, the doctrine is deceptively
simple to state—it enables patentees to reach beyond the literal wording of
their claims, but it remains extremely controversial in its application. This
Article traces the doctrine’s origins and explains the reasons for the doctrine’s
incoherence, the tension between judges and juries, and the decline of the
doctrine. This Article complements the doctrinal discussion with empirical
findings of interest to academics and practitioners, including “equitable
triggers” such as copying, design-arounds, and pioneer inventions. It also
investigates limits such as prosecution history estoppel, the “all-elements”
rule, the prior art bar and the public dedication rule.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts, patent attorneys, and legal scholars have wrestled with
operationalizing the doctrine of equivalents for nearly 150 years.2 A venerable
exception to normal patent infringement rules, the doctrine is deceptively
simple to state—it enables patentees to reach beyond the literal wording of
their claims, but it remains “extremely controversial” in its application.3 The
United States Supreme Court employed the doctrine to protect patentees from
those seeking “to evade liability for infringement by making only insubstantial
changes to a patented invention,”4 warning that without it, patents would be
“a hollow and useless thing” and “unscrupulous copyist[s]” would be
“encourage[d].”5 Unfortunately, no doctrine “has produced more angst,
controversy, or expense than the doctrine of equivalents.”6
2
See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 956–57 (2007) (summarizing concerns that the doctrine “was
swallowing the rule,” that it “ ‘lacks a coherent vision,’ ” that “[t]wo of the three most important
Supreme Court patent cases decided between 1981 and 2005 concerned the scope of a limitation
on the doctrine of equivalents . . . [with one] attracting more amicus briefs than any other Supreme
Court patent case up to that date.”). See also Mircea A. Tipescu, Future Trends on the Doctrine
of Equivalents?, LEXOLOGY (May 15, 2019),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0d00b2b9-ac39-4a9a-85f8-4bbf36a2e5ef;
Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit: “The Doctrine of Equivalents Applies ONLY in Exceptional
Cases”, PATENTLY-O (May 8, 2019), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/05/doctrine-equivalentsexceptional.html (disagreeing on whether the 2019 Federal Circuit case of Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz
Inc. was a “major step without precedential backing”). For significant scholarship on the doctrine,
see Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law:
Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (Jan. 1989); R. Polk Wagner,
Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159
(2002); Matthew J. Conigliaro, Andrew C. Greenberg & Mark A. Lemley, Foreseeability in
Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045 (2001); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of
Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2004); David
L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1157, 1177 (2011); Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 428
(2009) [hereinafter Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?]; Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of
the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371 (2010) [hereinafter Petherbridge, On the
Decline]; Michael Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope:
A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947 (2005); Doug Lichtman,
Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer and Nard, 93 GEO. L.J. 2013
(2005); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839 (May 1990); S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the
Twenty-First Century: Indeterminacy and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69 (2001).
3
See infra Part II. Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2, at 1371 (“The doctrine of
equivalents is a judicial creation that allows patentees to exclude others from the use of subject
matter beyond the textual scope of a patent's claims. This venerable—and extremely
controversial—doctrine is tolerated (or promoted) on the theory that it is fundamentally necessary
to protect the incentive structure of the patent system.”).
4
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727 (2002).
5
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
6
Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2, at 1372. See also Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at
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As with transactional lawyering, patent claim drafting relies on attorneys
identifying relevant contingencies and crafting words to mitigate risk as best
as foreseeable.7 Patent attorneys refine their claims during prosecution and
include alternative versions of the inventor’s original embodiment.8 The
difficulty stems from the doctrine straddling an uneasy balance between
giving patentees the full and fair scope of their rights and protecting public
reliance on the express wording of patent claims, or what Professor Donald
Chisum called the “Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum.”9 As he explained:

There is clearly an interest in providing a clear definition of
the scope of the patent right; lack of clarity can impede
legitimate investment in technology-based products and
services. On the other hand, strict and literal adherence to the
written claim in determining the scope of protection can invite
subversion of a valuable right and substantially diminish the
economic value of patents.10
Precision, however, comes at the cost of administrability. Whether
something is “equivalent” to a patented invention is fact-specific and elides
rote application of formulaic and mechanistic rules.11 Some commentators
attribute its unruly scope to it being an “equitable” doctrine.12 Others have
observed that the doctrine’s malleability makes it susceptible to biases.13

1948 (“Perhaps no doctrine in patent law is as controversial as the Doctrine of Equivalents . . .
.”).
7
Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1948–49 n.3.
8
Id. at 1952 (by “identifying and claiming the broadest patentable set of embodiments enabled by
the disclosure in the patent specification.”).
9
Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Protection for Patents After the Supreme Court's WarnerJenkinson Decision: The Fair Protection—Certainty Conundrum, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 6–7 (1998).
10
Id. at 6–7. See also Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1978 (“[C]ase law tries to strike an ad hoc
balance between patent owners’ interests and costs to the public, including the cost of uncertain
property rights.”).
11
Jonathon Taylor Reavill, Tipping the Balance: Hilton Davis and the Shape of Equity in the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 329 (1996).
12
Gregory J. Smith, The Federal Circuit's Modern Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent
Infringement, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901, 912 n.64 (1989) (“[C]ourts have justified the lack
of usable guidelines for applying the doctrine by stating that it is an equitable doctrine, and to
constrain it with rigid rules of application would compromise the court's equitable powers.”). See
also Reavill, supra note 11, at 358 (“Without intent, the doctrine of equivalents is no more than a
second stab at proving infringement for the patentee, and the doctrine loses both its equitable
nature and its justification.”).
13
See Reavill, supra note 11, at 365, 366 (describing juries as “pro-patent” and being prone to
“idealize inventors.”). See also Robert L. Harmon, Seven New Rules of Thumb: How the Federal
Circuit Has Changed the Way Patent Lawyers Advise Clients, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 573,
582 (1992) (“Show the jury that beribboned patent document, and establish that the defendant is
doing something pretty close to what is patented, and the question becomes not validity or
infringement but simply how much?”).
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The state of the doctrine of equivalents has been tied to “the health of
patents” generally in the United States.14 At the same time, “no patent doctrine
has been considered by the high Court more frequently than the doctrine of
equivalents.”15 Patentees routinely invoke it in patent infringement cases.16
Nowhere in patent law is uniformity more critical.17 It is uniformity that
enables patentees and potential defendants to assess litigation outcomes in
making investment decisions regarding research and development.18 Yet, the
Supreme Court recognized that “the doctrine of equivalents, when applied
broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the
statutory claiming requirement.”19 Some of the fiercest criticism of the
doctrine came from the Supreme Court itself. For instance, in his dissent,
Justice Black warned that the doctrine would result in claim wording
becoming “like a nose of wax, which may be turned and twisted in any
direction . . . so as to make it include something more than, or something
different from, what its words express.”20
The doctrine’s unpredictability “frustrates and chills” attempts by rivals
to legitimately design around patents fostering unnecessary litigation.21 Those
“attempting to determine today whether a device is equivalent to a patented
invention may know how the arguments on either side will unfold, but he is
unlikely to be able to predict with any real certainty which of those sides is
likely to prevail, and why.”22 This is problematic, not least because attorneys
14

Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 F.3d 1472, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Plager, J.,
dissenting). See also James K. Folker, A Legislative Proposal to Clarify and Simplify Patent
Infringement Analysis under the Doctrine of Equivalents, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 211, 233 (1996) (“Both
the lack of predictability and the inadequate public notice resulting from the current state of
doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence have a number of serious repercussions on individual
patentees and their competitors which, when considered industry-wide, may hinder innovation in
the country as a whole.”).
15
Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note, 2, at 1373. “Highly visible internal disputes and
outcry from the bar have been paralleled by Supreme Court review in some of the Court's most
famous patent cases of the modern era [since the creation of the Federal Circuit].” Id. at 1372-73.
16
See Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 977 (“[A] patentee is almost always arguing the doctrine
of equivalents as an alternative to a theory of literal infringement.”). Kurt L. Glitzenstein, A
Normative and Positive Analysis of the Scope of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 7 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 281, 290 (1994) (“The doctrine of equivalents is frequently raised, typically in the
alternative to a charge of literal infringement, in patent infringement actions.”). Tipescu, supra
note 2 (“Claims of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents routinely accompany literal
infringement claims in patent infringement litigation.”).
17
Timothy J. Douros, Lending the Federal Circuit A Hand: An Economic Interpretation of the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 321, 322 (1995) (“Nowhere in the patent law is such
uniformity more needed than in application of the doctrine of equivalents.”).
18
Adelman & Francione, supra note 2, at 682.
19
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
20
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
21
Adelman & Francione, supra note 2, at 683.
22
Glitzenstein, supra note 16, at 309–10.
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have to settle most patent disputes and rely heavily on at least tolerably
predictable rules to counsel on litigation avoidance and case settlement.23
Rivals risk infringement and must “forecast how far a court relatively
unversed in a particular technological field will expand the claim's language
after considering the testimony of technical experts in that field.”24
Congress created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to
introduce uniformity and certainty into patent law.25 Unfortunately the Federal
Circuit, like the Supreme Court, has “failed to synthesize an articulable
doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence,” notwithstanding many opportunities to
do so.26 Former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel judged the doctrine
“the most difficult and least predictable of all doctrines in patent law to
apply”27 and admitted the court’s decisions on the doctrine had done little to
increase the predictability of outcomes of disputes “litigated to conclusion
through appeal.”28 His successor, former Chief Judge Randall Rader confessed
that “[f]ew problems have vexed this court more than articulating discernible
standards for non-textual infringement.”29 Case law on the doctrine is in
disarray, with courts “analyz[ing] the facts on a completely ad hoc basis.”30

23
Hon. Paul R. Michel, The Role and Responsibility of Patent Attorneys in Improving the Doctrine
of Equivalents, 40 IDEA 123, 124 (2000) (“Predictability is key — because with courts
overburdened, patent lawyers will have to settle most patent disputes.”). See also Hilton Davis
Chemical Co. v. Walter-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev’d 520 U.S. 17
(1997) (Newman, J., concurring) (“[I]t will not serve that function if its application is so
unpredictable that it cannot be relied upon. Indeed, the determination of technologic equivalency
should be reasonably predictable by not only the innovator but also the competitor. When applied
to a particular patented invention, it should be, reasonably predictable whether a specific device
will be found “equivalent.”).
24
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 617.
25
Daryl Lim, I Dissent: The Federal Circuit's "Great Dissenter," Her Influence on the Patent
Dialogue, and Why It Matters, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 873, 876 (2017).
26
Glitzenstein, supra note 16, at 290 (“The extended doctrine of equivalents debate has, therefore,
generated far more heat than light.”). Id. at 309. See e.g. Sean T. Moorhead, The Doctrine of
Equivalents: Rarely Actionable Non-Literal Infringement or the Second Prong of Patent
Infringement Charges?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1421, 1438 (1992) (“The Federal Circuit has not
uniformly addressed the pioneer/non-pioneer issue.”). Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?,
supra note 2, at 424, 428 (reporting that the law exhibits “noticeable heterogeneity,” with “court
quite tolerant of jurisprudential diversity.”). As a normative matter, Petherbridge generally
defends this heterogeneity, noting that it allows the court “the flexibility to reach what it sees as
the ‘right’ result in most cases [but] could still promote uniformity of doctrinal development by
utilizing a judiciary that is . . . highly skilled and capable of great nuance in interpreting patent
law.” Id. at 429.
27
Michel, supra note 23, at 123.
28
Id. at 124 (“Today, as far as equivalent infringement goes, patent lawyers cannot with certainty
predict dispute outcomes under the doctrine of equivalents.”).
29
Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(Rader, J., concurring).
30
See Glitzenstein, supra note 16, at 309.
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The doctrine survived calls for legislative abrogation and despite its
frustrating vagueness, is here to stay.31 What then can stakeholders do to
mitigate its uncertainty while leveraging on its flexibility? According to some,
“any effort to reconcile the myriad decisions into a coherent vision is
Sisyphean.”32 The more optimistic argue that the problem lies not with the
doctrine but rather its application, with fixing inherently ambiguous operative
terms such as “substantially different” and “interchangeable” as the proper
way forward.33
The doctrine’s controversy and complexity allured many into attempting
to unravel its mysteries. Most studies “simply catalog the various cases and
highlight those facts that apparently were central to the finding, all in an effort
to assist the attorney seeking a factual analogy.”34 Some, however, have taken
a bolder leap forward, employing various approaches: Law and Economics,35
mathematical,36 and empirical.37 While each method has its own merits, the
rapidly growing field of empirical research in intellectual fuels the kind of
evidence-based decision-making that until recently was lacking.38
31
See Michel, supra note 23, at 124; see also D. Alan White, The Doctrine of Equivalents:
Fairness and Uncertainty in an Era of Biologic Pharmaceuticals, 60 EMORY L.J. 751, 778 (2011)
(“[A]bolishing the doctrine altogether would tilt the balance too far in the other direction,
narrowing the scope of patent protection and reducing the incentives for firms to develop pioneer
biologics in the first place.”). Craig Wallace, A Proposed Standard Jury Instruction for a Patent
Infringement Inquiry Under the Doctrine of Equivalents, 10 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 425,
427 (1994) (“While there has been criticism of the equivalents doctrine, the doctrine still applies
today and does not appear to be in danger of abandonment.”).
32
See also Glitzenstein, supra note 16, at 309.
33
Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 62 F.3d at 1535 (Newman, J., concurring) (“It is not the doctrine
of equivalents, but the uncertainty of its application, that causes the uncertainty in commercial
relationships.”).
34
Glitzenstein, supra note 16, at 309.
35
See Douros, supra note 17, at 330.
36
See Raj S. Davé, A Mathematical Approach to Claim Elements and the Doctrine of Equivalents,
16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 507 (2003).
37
See Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, supra note 2, at 1301 (covering Federal Circuit
decisions over a “fifteen-year period spanning [January 1, 1992 to May 2, 2007.]”). See also
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 963 (covering “every district court and court of appeals
decision on the doctrine of equivalents that appeared in Westlaw and was decided during three
eighteen-month periods[]” between 1999 and 2005); Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1183 (examining
cases between 1991 and 2008). See generally Darcy August Paul, The Judicial Doctrine of
Equivalents, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 247, 248 (2003) (covering the period between 1999 to 2002).
38
Hon. Ryan T. Holte & Ted M. Sichelman, Cycles of Obviousness, 105 IOWA L. REV. 107, 160
(2019) (describing how “empirical studies are typically more reliable than anecdote[.]”); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 510 (2015)
(“How do rules concerning such issues as patent duration, the requirement of nonobvious subject
matter, enablement, or the doctrine of equivalents perform in the market? There is very little
empirical study of how individual patent doctrines perform[.]”). For some examples of notable
empirical studies in intellectual property law, see Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of
Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2002). See also Allison & Lemley, supra note 2;
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Against this backdrop, this Article provides an empirical basis for
judges, scholars, policymakers, and patent attorneys to better understand the
doctrine’s nature in order to contextualize its evolution and chart its future. It
surveys the law and literature on the doctrine from its inception over 150 years
ago to the present day, and reports on contemporary results that will interest
these stakeholders. It tests conventional wisdom against 10,373 observable
datapoints gleaned from 316 Federal Circuit and district court cases between
2009 and 2018, including Rule 36 summary affirmances with no opinion.39
By coding the reasoning in each case, this Article reveals how district
courts and the Federal Circuit employed the doctrine. Patent litigators would
be interested in practical questions such as what arguments are most likely to
win? What role do factors like litigation venue, industry, and posture have on
outcomes? The descriptive statistics in this Article provide useful insights into
these questions and more. In so doing, this Article differs from prior studies
of the doctrine in three important ways.
First, earlier empirical studies examined factors leading to the doctrine’s
decline.40 While this study investigates that decline, it also investigates
allegations of juries parsing patent claims “based on emotion rather than
reason,”41 as well as a wealth of causal factors normally invisible when
studying even landmark cases in isolation. These include litigation aspects
such as venue, outcome, industry, and procedural posture, as well as doctrinal
aspects such as the doctrine’s scope, equitable triggers (such as copying,
independent design, and pioneer inventions), and limits (such as prosecution
history estoppel and the “all-elements” rule).
Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2; David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An
Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223
(2008); David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade
Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699 (2009); Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The
Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 2051 (2007); Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, supra note 2; Christopher A.
Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (2007); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal
Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001); Jay P. Kesan &
Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the
Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237 (2006); Kimberly A.
Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C.
L. REV. 889 (2001).
39
Of the 110 Federal Circuit decisions, nineteen were Rule 36 decisions. See Holte & Sichelman,
supra note 38, at 140 (indicating that Rule 36 decisions provide confidence in the
comprehensiveness of the dataset).
40
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1158–59 (summarizing earlier studies either attributing the decline
to trial courts displacing juries in construing patent claims or to the Supreme Court’s Festo
decision reducing the doctrine’s applicability); see also id. (attributing the decline to “doctrinal
reallocation” and “doctrinal displacement.”).
41
Peter K. Schalestock, Equity for Whom? Defining the Reach of Non-Literal Patent Infringement,
19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 323, 347 (1996).
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Second, this study is based on contemporary unbroken data. Past studies
relied on cases decided between 1991 and 2008, meaning that as of 2019 they
are between ten and twenty-eight years old.42 By starting the period of study
from cases decided in 2009, the Article also picks up where the most
contemporaneous study (which capped off its dataset in 2008) left off.
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent have changed the law and earlier
studies understandably capture only a sliver of its impact over time.43 The
Article covers ten years of district court and appeals cases. By using a large
data set without gaps, this study can track the impact of important
jurisprudential developments, and do so by building on the work done by
earlier studies.44 Some of these earlier studies also omitted jury decisions,
district court decisions, non-precedential decisions, and unreported decisions
creating gaps in their datasets.45 Results from this Article therefore enable
meaningful comparisons across time by isolating factors such as win rates,46
the success of arguments related to the doctrines tests and limits,47 as well as
variations in technology sectors and outcomes.48
Third, the results and conclusions of this study have immediate
application to patent law and beyond. Findings may be used to craft a standard
jury instruction or assist in patent law reform.49 Findings should be of interest
to the patent system more generally. Moreover, the implications of the study
go beyond patent law in at least three ways: first, the doctrine has roots in
contract law and so may help analysis of contractual terms;50 second, if it turns
out that juries are incapable of properly applying the doctrine, current practice

42

See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1182..
See id. at 1188 (“Changes to one doctrine may cause substantive effects on the law in other
doctrines.”).
44
See Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2, at 1378.
45
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 976 (published opinions were a representative subset of all
opinions). See id. at 963–64 (omitting jury decisions to focus on written decisions “to parse the
grounds for decisions and the reasoning of the opinions.”); Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra
note 2, at 1378. See also Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1183 (focusing only on Federal Circuit cases);
see also id. at 1186 (“[N]on-precedential opinions typically are not as well organized . . .
present[ing] potential coding difficulties.”).
46
See Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 966 (“By far the most dramatic finding of our study is
that patentees rarely win doctrine of equivalents cases,” where the study reported that patentees
won only 24% of decided cases over the eight-year period studied.).
47
Id. at 974–75.
48
Id. at 972–73 (noting that while mechanical devices made up 61.7% of the cases,
pharmaceuticals only made up 6.5% of the cases). See also id. (finding no win-rate variation
between industries).
49
Michel, supra note 23, at 128 (noting the lack of clear “instruction or advice [that] courts give
to lay juries when determining whether equivalence occurs[.]”).
50
See Reavill, supra note 11, at 347 (“[M]any commentators point to the law of contracts as a
basis for the pure equity nature of the doctrine.”).
43
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may violate patentees’ Fifth Amendment’s rights to due process;51 third, the
doctrine’s goals in tension with each other—protecting patentees from fraud
on their patents and protecting accused infringers from unfair trials and
liability without adequate notice of the law undergirds property law and may
help inform debates there;52 fourth, the results inform reconceptualizing the
doctrine. For instance, the doctrine, while promoting fairness to the patentee,
is not meant to be an equitable doctrine in the sense understood by lawyers.53
However, that seems to be the way that juries have understood and applied
it.54
Part I of the Article traces the doctrine’s origins and delves into the heart
of its policy tensions. It begins in 1853 when the doctrine emerged from the
sheaves of a Supreme Court decision, and then traces the doctrine’s evolution
through the twentieth and twenty-first century to its modern incarnation. It sets
out the reasons for the doctrine’s incoherence and reveals that deep distrust by
judges of juries. Commentators generally agree the judiciary have displaced
the jury in employing the doctrine, but there is less consensus when it took
place and how.
Part II presents the first empirical study ever done on how courts treat
“equitable triggers” of the doctrine such as copying, the pioneer nature of the
invention, as well as independent invention and attempts to design around the
patented claims. It reveals that most cases between 2009 – 2018 neither
mentioned equity in any form, nor did equity have any discernable effect on
case outcomes. These suggest that the doctrine’s “equitable” roots, while
seared into conventional wisdom, has surprisingly little relevance in practice.
To the extent equitable considerations exist, they manifested most strongly
when parties were rivals and when the case involved allegations of copying.
Similarly, defendants who were not rivals of the patentees-in-suit were more
likely to prevail than if the parties were rivals in cases involving claims of
design-arounds and independent invention. There was only one case that
discussed pioneer inventions and no meaningful conclusion can be drawn
there except that those cases are exceedingly rare.
Part III investigates the doctrine’s well-known limits: the prior art bar,
the “all-elements” rule, the public dedication rule, and the most controversial
one of them all—prosecution history estoppel. It confirms conventional
wisdom that patentees generally do worse than defendants, though patentee
wins rallied in recent years under the prosecution history estoppel and the
51
Id. at 363 (“Allowing jurors to decide issues that lie beyond their full understanding thus
violates due process under the Fifth Amendment.”).
52
See Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 48 (2009) (“In property law, constructive possession akin to the doctrine of equivalents
is often justified on the basis of fairness.”).
53
See infra Part II.
54
See infra Section I.C.
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public dedication rule. Additionally, the data revealed that patentees
performed the best under the prior art bar, followed by the public dedication
rule, prosecution history estoppel, and performed worst under the “allelements” rule. Part IV concludes.
This Article has five associated Annexes devoted to comprehensively
setting out the quantitative aspect of the study to aid future research on this
important issue. Annex A presents this empirical study design and
methodology. Annex B provides a table of figures. Annex C and D provide
hyperlinks to the coding key and dataset respectively. All Annexes can be
obtained from the author upon request.
I.

THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

Patentees can exclude others from making, using, or selling their
inventions according to the scope of their patent claims.55 It has become as
much an aphorism in patent law as elections are to democracy. As Judge Giles
Rich, whose name is synonymous with U.S. patent law, observed “[t]he name
of the game is the claim.”56 Ironically, early patent legislation did not require
claims and infringement focused entirely instead on the “essence” of the
patented device through an inquiry into equivalence.57
The requirement for claims appeared only in 1836 when Congress
removed from courts the task of “ascertaining the exact invention of the
patentee by inference and conjecture.”58 From that point on, patents included
claims that had to “particularly specify and point out the part, improvement,
or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery.”59

55
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010). See also 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) (“The specification shall
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the [applicant] regards as [his] invention.”).
56
Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American
Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990); see also John
Witherspoon, Giles Sutherland Rich: The Patent Legacy that Started with a Failed Eye Exam,
IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/27/giles-sutherland-richpatent-legacy/id=77628/.
57
See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109–12 (repealed 1793); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11,
§ 10, 1 Stat. 318–23 (repealed 1836). See also Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432); see also Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of
Equivalents and Claiming the Future, Part I (1790-1870), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
371, 385–86 (2005) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Part I] (“For the first two decades after the 1836 Patent
Act, the Supreme Court did not definitively resolve whether the various forms of claim language
employed after Evans might result in a disclaimer of patentable subject matter disclosed in the
specification. During this period, “the whole patent document, including the claims as a guide,
was to be viewed to ascertain the scope and nature of the invention and to determine whether the
invention was embodied in the defendant's practices or devices.”).
58
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836); Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95
U.S. 274, 278 (1877).
59
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 119 (repealed 1870).
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Claims at that time continued to focus on the invention’s “essence,”
requiring courts to employ an equivalents-based approach to infringement.60
The Supreme Court determined patent scope by reference to the “specification
of claim” and not by reference to the disclosed invention in the specification.61
This meant that juries had to discern “principles of the invention from the
patent document’s textual description and schematic representations.”62 The
claims, not the specification, determine the invention’s scope. Under this
“central claiming” approach, patentees disclose the central features of their
inventions and how they differ from the prior art.63 Courts determined the
scope of the patent claim by “looking at the prior art that cabins the invention,
how important the patentee's invention was, and how different the accused
device is.”64 The task often led jurors to “find no infringement because they
see [so] many superficial differences between the defendant’s machine and
the description of the patented invention[.]”65 For this reason, the doctrine of
equivalents exists so patentees can expand the scope of their claim to cover
accused products differing only in minor ways. Importantly, however, courts
did not extend patent scope beyond the construed scope of the patent claims
until 1950.66
By 1870, new patent legislation introduced “peripheral claims” defining
the outer limits of the invention rather than the essence of the patent’s
coverage.67 Claims provided jurors guidance and called “attention to what the
inventor considered the salient features of his invention.”68 Infringement now
focused on the literal language of the claims, with equivalents invoked only
“when the equities of a particular case required an equivalency test.”69 With
claims becoming central to the infringement analysis, courts developed a two-

60
See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 344 (1853). See also Ronald D. Hantman, Doctrine of
Equivalents, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 511, 516–17 (1988).
61
See Winans, 56 U.S. at 338–39.
62
Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1962.
63
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1746 (2009).
64
Id.
65
John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents,
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 309 (2002).
66
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Conference Presenter at the IPIL National Conference: Has There Been
Patent Law Progress in the Progress of Patent Law? (June 3, 2017).
67
Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1952). See Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co.,
126 U.S. 1, 539 (1888). (“[A] patent . . . is not to be confined to the mere means [the patentee]
improvised to prove the reality of his conception.”); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern
Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the Future: Part II (1870-1952), 87 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 441, 454 (2005) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Part II] (“As a result of the Court's
more permissive approach to functional claiming for pioneering processes, a patentee could patent
all subsequent embodiments of a broadly claimed process even though the specification disclosed
only a single embodiment.”).
68
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
69
Reavill, supra note 11, at 330.
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part process: (1) interpret the claims and look for literal infringement; and (2)
expand patent rights when required by the principle of the invention.70
A. Origins & Scope
The Supreme Court formally recognized the doctrine of equivalents in
1853 when it held that patent scope should “allow inventors to retain to their
own use what they themselves have created.”71 The doctrine may have been
rooted in Lockean theory—inventors should be justly rewarded for their labor,
a remedy for rivals unjustly enriching themselves from a patented invention
but does nothing to advance technology, or a safety net against Patent Office
errors improperly limiting patent scope.72 From its birth, however, the doctrine
was met with fierce opposition. Four dissenters in the Court cited the Patent
Act’s requirement to “specify and point out” their claimed invention.73
Anything less would be “mischievous” and “productive of oppressive and
costly litigation, of exorbitant and unjust pretensions and vexatious
demands.”74
In 1950, the Court shifted its focus from exclusive rights over the
inventive concept patentees were entitled to concern over defendants’
behavior.75 Instead of the rationale where patentees are entitled to their
70
See, e.g., Winans, 56 U.S. at 343 (“The exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured if
the public is at liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or proportions. And,
therefore, the patentee, having described his invention, and shown its principles, and claimed it in
that form which most perfectly embodies it, is, in contemplation of law, deemed to claim every
form in which his invention may be copied, unless he manifests an intention to disclaim some of
those forms.”).
71
Id. at 344 (finding infringement where the accused equivalent substantially embodied the
patentee's mode of operation to achieve “the same kind of result” as the patented invention);
Sarnoff, Part I, supra note 57, at 375 (“In 1853, to assure a fair scope of protection, the Court in
Winans v. Denmead adopted a liberal construction of a claim's language so that the claim would
apply to an equivalent technology that was known to be a substitute for the invention described
in the patent specification. The application of patents to substituted technologies later became
known as the ‘doctrine of equivalents.’ However, a doctrine of equivalents has existed since the
beginning of American patent law, originating as a necessary comparison of the allegedly
infringing product or process to the patented invention before formal claim language was required.
For over a century after Evans, the Supreme Court was careful to limit this historic doctrine of
equivalents to the direct application of construed claim language.”). See also McCormick v.
Talcott, 61 U.S. 402, 405 (1857) (first using the phrase “doctrine of equivalents”).
72
See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 2, at 201 (noting but not endorsing the view that the doctrine of
equivalents “is justified on the grounds that it better reflects the intellectual contribution of the
inventor”); Nelson v. Batson, 322 F.2d 132, 135 (9th Cir. 1963) (a more contemporary
manifestation of Lockean theory, noting “the degree of protection afforded beyond the language
of the claims will vary directly with the value of the inventor's contribution to the art.”).
73
Winans, 56 U.S. at 347.
74
Id.
75
See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 605. However it is worth noting that cases involving
pioneering inventions that influenced the Court’s decision took place earlier. For a discussion, see
Sarnoff, Part II, supra note 67, at 452 (“From 1870 until 1950, the Court consistently held that
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creations, it justified the doctrine as an equitable safeguard against “piracy,”
“stealing,” and “fraud.”76 The Court recognized that “[o]utright and forthright
duplication is a . . . very rare type of infringement,” but was nonetheless
concerned that rivals could make “unimportant and insubstantial changes” to
the literal claims of a patent, rendering patents “hollow and useless.”77 It
instructed that “[t]o temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from
stealing the benefit of an invention,” patentees may invoke the doctrine “if it
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
obtain the same result.”78
Once again, a new generation of Supreme Court judges expressed
discomfort with the doctrine. Writing for himself and Justice Douglas, Justice
Black reiterated Justice Campbell’s earlier concern for requiring patentees to
“particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or
combination which he claims as his invention or discovery.”79 He also
criticized the majority in the present case for its “emasculation” of express
claim wording, pointing to amendments and reissue patents as the proper
alternative.80 According to Justice Black, the doctrine became end-run around
a “program for alleviation of such hardships which Congress itself has
provided.”81
With the Federal Circuit’s emergence in 1982, the doctrine’s
controversies migrated to that court. Congress created the Federal Circuit
partially to resolve circuit splits of this sort in district courts and the circuit
courts of appeals.82 However, the same ideological divide soon infected
Federal Circuit judges as it did their Supreme Court brethren.83 The Federal
Circuit, in two en banc decisions in 1985 and 1987 failed to provide a
patent protection - including the doctrine of equivalents - was limited to the scope of application
of construed claim language (although that scope had been dramatically expanded for pioneering
patents).”). Sarnoff, Part I, supra note 57, at 375, 376 (“The modern doctrine of equivalents thus
extends patent protection beyond the scope of physical embodiments (i.e., applications, whether
or not enumerated in the specification) of a claim's language. It extends the exclusionary patent
law infringement right (and contributory liability) to additional products or processes that are
considered to be factually equivalent to those embodiments.”).
76
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 607–08.
77
Id. at 607 (stating the reason for the doctrine of equivalents is to protect patent holders from an
“unscrupulous copyist”); see also id. at 608 (“The essence of the doctrine is that one may not
practice a fraud on a patent.”).
78
Id. at 608 (internal quotation marks omitted).
79
Id. at 613.
80
Id. at 614–15 (Black, J., dissenting).
81
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 614–15 (Black, J., dissenting).
82
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–164, §127, 96 Stat. 25, 37–38
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1295); see S. Rep. No. 97–275, at 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (noting that the Federal Circuit would “increase doctrinal stability in the
field of patent law”).
83
Blaine Larson, Comment, How Tangential Does It Have to Be?: Making Sense of Festo’s
Tangential Limitations Doctrine, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 959, 968 (2011) (summarizing case law).
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definitive approach to applying the doctrine.84 Similar to the current quandary
with patent eligible subject matter, practitioners were left unable to predict
how a court might treat precedent in any given case.85 It was up to the Supreme
Court to weigh in once again.
In 1997 the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this “significant
disagreement” between how to balance between public notice and fairness to
patentees.86 It determined that the doctrine was administrable despite its
imprecision if courts remained vigilant to its underlying policies and guard
against patentees seeking to “eliminate completely” the technological
substance behind claim limitations. In doing so, it set out two limitations to
the doctrine: the “all-elements” rule and prosecution history estoppel.87
The “all-elements” rule requires patentees to show that the accused
device contains elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of
the patented invention.88 This rule prevents patentees from using the doctrine
to broaden a claim element to vitiate the other claim elements, so claim
limitations cannot be construed in ways that render them meaningless.89 If an
accused device does not contain at least an equivalent for each limitation of
the claim, there is no infringement because a required part of the claimed
invention is missing. As with the doctrine, courts have “no set formula for

84
See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc);
Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at 931, cert. denied 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
85
See Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (producing eight separate opinions in a denial for rehearing en banc); see also Douglas
A. Strawbridge, Daniel W. McDonald & R. Carl Moy, Patent Law Developments in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1986, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 861, 887–88
(1987).
86
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 21 (noting its goal was to “to clarify the proper scope” of
the doctrine); see also Sarnoff, supra note 57, at 376–77 (noting that the Court “extended
equivalents protection to later-arising equivalent technologies, and imperfectly reconciled the
modern doctrine with the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel for amended claims.”). See also
id. (describing how the Court “departed from its historic standards for strictly construing
statements and amendments made by the applicant during prosecution and for determining
whether they resulted in implied disclaimers of patentable subject matter.”).
87
See id. at 17; see also Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1979.
88
Id. at 29. (“Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope
of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual
elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.”). Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1979
n.161 (“Suppose a patent claims a process comprising step 1, followed by step 2, followed by step
3. Suppose an alleged infringer gets the process to work using step 1 followed by step 3 with step
2 omitted. Then there is no literal infringement because step 2 is omitted. Similarly, the allelements rule of Pennwalt precludes application of the DOE because step 2 is omitted. Under the
old rule, a finding of infringement under the DOE was possible when courts looked at the
invention as a whole.”).
89
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 39 n.8 (“Vitiation” is not an exception to the doctrine of
equivalents, but instead a legal determination that “the evidence is such that no reasonable jury
could determine two elements to be equivalent[.]”).
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determining whether a finding of equivalence would vitiate a claim limitation,
and thereby violate the all [elements] rule.”90
The “all-elements rule” was a refinement to determining patent
infringement by the looking at the patented invention’s “essence.” The Federal
Circuit initially determined infringement by looking at the claimed invention
holistically.91 It later cabined this approach because it gave insufficient weight
to claim limitations and too much leeway to juries, a theme that would run
through the doctrine’s history to the present day.92 Ostensibly, the rule
encourages patentees to craft their claims carefully, and discourages “abstract,
holistic arguments in favor of equivalency.”93 Judges would employ the “allelements” rule where applicants could have easily written claims to literally
cover the defendant’s product and did not.94 Courts also compare the accused
device with the patent claim not simply the two devices.95
The Court’s second limitation to the doctrine, prosecution history
estoppel, teaches that “any surrender of subject matter during patent
prosecution, regardless of the reason for such surrender, precludes recapturing
any part of that subject matter, even if it is equivalent to the matter expressly
claimed.”96 Prosecution history is the public record of the correspondence
between patent applicants and examiners during the prosecution process.97
Just as legislative history aids statutory interpretation, prosecution history
illuminates the breadth of claims.98 Patentees who disclaim embodiments
during the prosecution process cannot recover those embodiments at trial

90

Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1364. (Fed. Cir. 1983).
92
See Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at 935 (“[E]ach limitation must be viewed in the context of the
entire claim [.]”). See also Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1979.
93
Lee Petherbridge, On the Development of Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893, 929 (2010)
[hereinafter Petherbridge, On the Development of Patent Law].
94
Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Thus, for a patentee who
has claimed an invention narrowly, there may not be infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents in many cases, even though the patentee might have been able to claim more broadly.
If it were otherwise, then claims would be reduced to functional abstracts, devoid of meaningful
structural limitations on which the public could rely.”).
95
See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 29 (“[T]he doctrine of equivalents must be applied to
individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.”); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,
970 F.2d 816, 822, n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[C]laim limitations drawn to a pen would not under the
doctrine of equivalents cover a pencil and vice versa.”) (emphasis in original).
96
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 30. See also Sarnoff, Part I, supra note 57, at 377 (“[T]he
Court departed from its historic standards for strictly construing statements and amendments made
by the applicant during prosecution and for determining whether they resulted in implied
disclaimers of patentable subject matter.”).
97
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
98
See id. (comparing prosecution history to legislative history); 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(a) (2005)
(prosecution history becomes public post-issuance.).
91
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through the doctrine.99 The estoppel usually arises when applicants narrow
claims in response to objections that the original wording is not enabled or is
unpatentable in view of the prior art.100
As the Court explained, prosecution history estoppel is linked both to
“the role of claims in defining an invention and providing public notice, and
to the primacy of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in ensuring that
the claims allowed cover only subject matter that is properly patentable in a
proffered patent application.”101 Conventional wisdom teaches that the
doctrine of equivalents is mostly used to correct errors made by applicants.102
In this way, the prominence of prosecution history estoppel seems apt.
However, the Court left two major issues unanswered. First, what types of
claim amendments give rise to prosecution history estoppel? And second, does
prosecution history estoppel completely bar the doctrine or simply limit the
range of its application?
These issues divided the lower courts in what commentators described
as a “tumultuous” period.103 Some judges allowed a “flexible bar,” favoring
broader protection for patent holders, while others preferred a strict rule
favoring clear notice to the public and treating a narrowing amendment of as
a complete surrender of subject matter.104 The Federal Circuit attempted to
resolve the issue en banc, holding that prosecution history estoppel arises from
any amendment that narrows a claim to comply with the Patent Act, not only
from amendments made to avoid the prior art.105 It rejected the Supreme
Court’s approach as “unworkable,” and brazenly declared that “prosecution
history estoppel acts as a complete bar to the application of the doctrine of
equivalents when an amendment has narrowed the scope of a claim[.]”106 The
Federal Circuit declared that when estoppel applies, it bars any claim of
equivalence for the element that was amended.107 Its approach, however, only
served to stoke the divisions further, resulting in many calling for the Supreme
Court to resolve the controversy.108
99
See Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942); Conigliaro, Greenberg &
Lemley, supra note 2, at 1064–65 (explaining how it is “based on the equitable concept of an
implied promise”).
100
See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998), overruled on other
grounds (en banc) (illustrating how a narrowing argument leads to estoppel).
101
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 33–34.
102
Adelman & Francione, supra note 2, at 716.
103
See Chisum, supra note 9, at 14 (describing the state of the law at the time as “tumultuous”);
see also Davé, supra note 36, at 511.
104
See Larson, supra note 83, at 967 (summarizing relevant case law).
105
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(en banc).
106
Id. at 574.
107
Id.
108
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 960.
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Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court turned to focus on the doctrine
once more in 2002.109 In what commentators have dubbed “the most important
Supreme Court patent case since Congress created the Federal Circuit,” the
Court unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit.110 The Supreme Court
chastised the Federal Circuit for “ignor[ing] [its] guidance” and disrupting
“the settled expectations of the inventing community.”111 While
acknowledging the importance of certainty, the Court recognized that
literalism would “greatly diminish” the value of patents, and opted for a
“flexible” approach to allow patentees to overcome the presumption that
prosecution history estoppel applied.112 The Court justified its preference for
favoring patentees because it was impossible to draft claims that perfectly
covered their intended scope and diminish patent value.113 This was, the Court
wrote, “the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation[.]”114
As a general rule, the Court held that narrowing amendments “may be
presumed to be a general disclaimer of the territory between the original claim
and the amended claim.”115 However, patentees may rebut that presumption
by showing “at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally
encompassed the alleged equivalent.”116 This occurs when: (1) the equivalent
was “unforeseeable at the time of the application”; (2) the rationale behind the
amendment bore “no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in
question”; or (3) there was “some other reason” a patent applicant could not
have been expected to describe “the insubstantial substitute in question.”117
An equivalent is foreseeable if a skilled artisan would know an
alternative existed and the patentee should have claimed it.118 Since the
patentee did not claim the alternative, it cannot later use the doctrine to capture
that variation.119 Commentators observed that “by electing to emphasize the
109

Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 722.
Id. at 742; Larson, supra note 83, at 971; see also Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1981 (called
Festo “one of the most significant patent law cases in recent history.”).
111
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 739.
112
Id. at 738 (“We have considered what equivalents were surrendered during the prosecution of
the patent, rather than imposing a complete bar that resorts to the very literalism the equivalents
rule is designed to overcome.”).
113
Id. at 731 (“The language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention
or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty.”).
114
Id. at 732.
115
Id. at 740.
116
Id. at 741.
117
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740–41.
118
See Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 523 F.3d 1304, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
119
See Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1425 (a “subsequent change in the state of the art, such as laterdeveloped technology, obfuscated the significance of [the] limitation at the time of its
incorporation into the claim.”).
110
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policy of public notice, courts have challenged the legitimacy of the premise
that the doctrine of equivalents is necessary to protect the incentive structure
of the patent system.”120 Courts themselves have recognized that benefiting
patentees through non-textual infringement comes at the expense of clarity
and notice to the public.121
The second way patentees can rebut the prosecution history is to show
that the amendment bears little to no relationship to the asserted equivalent.
Here, commentators say the inquiry “focus[es] on the intent of the applicant
in making the relevant amendment.”122 The patentee could not have
voluntarily surrendered the equivalent if subject matter related to a different
aspect of the invention.123
The Federal Circuit articulated three principles on tangentiality: (1)
“peripheral . . . to the alleged equivalent,”124 (2) “discernable from the
prosecution history,”125 (3) whatever they surrender to obtain a patent, even if
the final scope of the claims is narrower than necessary to avoid prior art.126
There remains “still no consistent definition for when a narrowing amendment
is tangential.”127 The third and final way patentees can rebut prosecution
history estoppel is to show that there is “some other reason” for the narrowing
amendment.128
To this day, the Supreme Court has not spoken on the doctrine of
equivalents. However, the doctrine has not remained dormant. The Federal
Circuit and district courts continue to struggle with its ad hoc and amorphous
boundaries. For instance, in 2019 the Federal Circuit attempted to cabin the
doctrine to “exceptional cases” to prevent it from becoming “simply the
second prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend
protection beyond the scope of the claims.”129 In a recent blog post response,

120

Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2, at 1404.
Thomas K. Landry, Certainty and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, The Doctrine
of Equivalents, and Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1202 (1994)
(concluding that “[n]o one should expect the court to achieve certainty in the doctrine of
equivalents.”).
122
Holbrook, supra note 52, at 26.
123
See Biagro W. Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423 F.3d 1296, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
124
Id.
125
O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
126
See, e.g., Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 432 F.3d 1356, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
127
Larson, supra note 83, at 961; Nicholas Pumfrey et al., The Doctrine of Equivalents in Various
Patent Regimes—Does Anybody Have It Right?, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 261, 268 (2009) (arguing
the term “tangential” is “totally devoid of linguistic content as applied to patent law”).
128
See generally Erin Conway, Note, The Aftermath of Festo v. SMC: Is There “Some Other
Reason” for Justifying the Third Festo Rebuttal Criterion?, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1655, 1672–
73, 1677–87 (2007) (analyzing the third Festo II criterion).
129
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 923 F.3d 1023, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
121
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Professor Dennis Crouch pushed back, criticizing the Federal Circuit’s
limitation as “a major step without precedential backing.”130
According to Professors Michael Meurer and Craig Nard, “[t]o the extent
that a modern justification for the doctrine can be inferred, it apparently starts
with the belief that the patent system generally works to give inventors patent
claims with the proper breadth, but sometimes frictions in the system cause
patent claims to be too narrow.131 They explain that courts use the doctrine as
an “efficient response to frictions present in the claims drafting process . . . to
restore proper patent scope and provide the appropriate incentive to create and
disclose inventions.”132 They identify three sources of “friction”: (1) mistakes
committed when drafting and prosecuting a patent,133 (2) limitations of
language,134 and (3) the difficulty in foreseeing technical developments
relevant to the patented technology.135
The corollary to a malleable standard is that determining the scope of
equivalents becomes a fact-intensive endeavor. Minor, inconsequential
changes enable rivals avoiding literal infringement and allowing them to avoid
infringement in this manner diminishes the value of patents and harms
innovation incentives.136 The other policy encourages rivals to innovate with
clear notice of what patents embrace so they can read and design around
them.137 A skilled person in the art reading claims should understand the scope
of the patent and avoid infringement.138
130

Crouch, supra note 2.
Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1950.
132
Id. at 1968.
133
Adelman & Francione, supra note 2, at 711 (“Most frequently, patent holders use the doctrine
of equivalents to rectify what is effectively a ‘mistake’ in the process of drafting and prosecuting
the application in the PTO. The patent holder argues that the failure to include something in the
claim was an oversight.”); In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“An attorney’s
failure to appreciate the full scope of the invention is one of the most common sources of defects
in patents.”).
134
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“An invention exists
most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an
afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to
words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention
is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the
inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the sake of words, but words for things.”).
135
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740–41; Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1970.
136
Chisum, supra note 9, at 7 (“[S]trict and literal adherence to the written claim in determining
the scope of protection can invite subversion of a valuable right and substantially diminish the
economic value of patents.”).
137
Min-Chiuan Wang, Nuisance Law and the Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law, 34 SANTA
CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 110, 146 (2017) (“[T]hese tests are all designed to determine whether the
accused infringer took the use of the inventive concept of the patent in question. Purely taking the
inventive concept of a patent without making a substantial change falls under ‘moving along the
Pareto frontier,’ rather than ‘shifting the frontier outward.’ ”).
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Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting the “bedrock
principle” of patent law that claims define the scope of a patent).
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In sum, the doctrine remains unruly and challenging to properly
administer. To many, the doctrine of equivalents “lacks a coherent vision” and
is the most controversial doctrine in patent law,139 with some observing that
“[t]he patent community continues to struggle to develop an analysis that is
both equitable and predictable.”140 Why has it been so difficult to articulate a
coherent doctrine? What have courts done to bridle this unruly doctrine? And
does the doctrine even matter today? This Article offers empirical evidence
from which to understand the doctrine’s past and to chart its future. These are
the issues which the next parts will explore.
B. Incoherence
Anyone who makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells a patented invention,
within the United States, or imports into the United States a patented invention
during the term of the patent without the patentee’s permission is guilty of
patent infringement.141 To determine infringement, courts may look at the
substantial identity of the accused product or process to the claimed
invention.142 This measures the degree to which the alleged infringer
appropriated the patentee’s inventive concept.143
In 1950, the Supreme Court underscored that its “function-way-result”
test was not a “prisoner of a formula.”144 In 1997, it endorsed the “insubstantial
differences” test as a possible alternative but declined to choose one.145 Lower
courts continued to determine equivalence in an ad hoc fashion, with no
guidance from the Federal Circuit.146 Describing the “insubstantial differences
test” as “elusive and frustrating,” commentators note that “the Federal Circuit
has not, and probably will never, set out a definitive formula for determining
whether an element of an accused device is a “substantial equivalent” of a

139
Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1948 (“[N]o doctrine in patent law is as controversial as the
Doctrine of Equivalents.”).
140
Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr., The Doctrine of Equivalents: Twelve Years of Federal Circuit
Precedent Still Leaves Practitioners Wondering, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1994);
Moorhead, supra note 26, at 1429 (“This difficulty is enhanced by the fact that even the members
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit cannot agree on its application.”).
141
35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
142
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 41–42 (1929).
143
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1526 (“[W]here a device is a copy of the thing described by the
patentee, ‘either without variation, or with such variations as are consistent with its being in
substance the same thing.’ ”).
144
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 609; see also Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 727 (“[B]y
extending protection beyond the literal terms in a patent the doctrine of equivalents can create
substantial uncertainty about where the patent monopoly ends.”).
145
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 39 (“[T]he particular linguistic framework used is less
important than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry[.]”).
146
See Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that
equivalency must be determined on a case-by-case basis).
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claim limitation pertaining to a claim element.”147 Whether under the
“function-way-result” test or the “insubstantial differences” test, there are
several reasons fueling the perennial struggle for clarity.
First, courts must decipher the substance and nature of the invention. The
“function-way-result test” demands a single result and a single function.
Sometimes each invention may produce many results and have many
functions. At other times, “function” and “result” may be essentially the same
thing,148 and “[b]ecause the accused infringers are often competitors of the
patentees, the accused device and the patented device normally have the same
function and result, and thus the determination normally turns on the “way”
component.”149
One Federal Circuit case illustrates the arbitrariness in which courts can
interpret “way” despite clear and narrow claim language.150 The court found
equivalence even though an element of the claim was missing in the accused
device and where another performed in the opposite direction in the accused
device.151 The opinion suggests that meeting the “function” and “result”
prongs satisfies the “way” prong too.152 Moreover, the “function-way-result”
test may result in a broader range than the “insubstantial differences” test.
Ibuprofen could infringe a claim for aspirin despite their distinct chemical
structures, because the drugs performed the same function in the same way to
give the same results.153
Similarly, the particularized analysis of the “all-elements” rule was
meant to better serve the notice function.154 In practice, courts have difficulty
matching language and meaning. While the “all-elements” rule constrains the
doctrine by requiring a mapping of elements, it does not prevent uncertainty
springing from how courts choose to define the elements of a claim.155
147

Moorhead, supra note 26, at 1433.
See Donald R. Dunner & J. Michael Jakes, The Equitable Doctrine of Equivalents, 75 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 857, 864 n.42 (1993).
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Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1531 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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See Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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See id. at 1258–61.
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Folker, supra note 14, at 230.
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Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1546 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 29–30. (“Each element contained in a patent claim is
deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of
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doctrine of equivalents does not encroach beyond the limits just described, or beyond related
limits . . . we are confident that the doctrine will not vitiate the central functions of the patent
claims themselves.”).
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Matthew C. Phillips, Taking a Step Beyond Maxwell To Tame the Doctrine of Equivalents, 11
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 155, 162 (2000) (“The definition of an ‘element’ is
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According to Former Chief Judge Michel, it is unclear to the Federal Circuit
when an equivalence “vitiates” or “effectively eliminates” a claim
limitation.156 Some cases focus on the combination as a whole,157 while others
indicate that an equivalent of every claim limitation must be found in the
accused device.158 The distinction seems to depend on whether the patent
covers a “pioneer invention.”159 If so, the claims enjoy broad protection, which
commentators attribute to the lack of relevant prior art rather than an expansive
interpretation of the claims themselves.160 The rule thus preserves the narrow
scope of patents in a crowded field, and in so doing, complements the
doctrine’s favoring of pioneer inventors.161
Second, the “function-way-result” test merely gives the purpose and goal
of claim elements, but does not define the invention. The “way” an element
operates only supplies “the means or mechanism by which it operates, but does
not reliably tell what the invention is”162 because this “is what structural terms
in the claims are for.”163 Additionally, while claims may also use “means plus
function” language, which does not explicitly define structure in the claim
itself, structure is implicitly defined because interpretation of such “means
plus function” language is “construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts defined in the specification and equivalents thereof.”164
In both these aspects, the “insubstantial differences test” does not fare
well either. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted that “the insubstantial
differences test offers little additional guidance as to what might render any
given difference ‘insubstantial.’ ”165 While the Court saw “no purpose in going
further and micromanaging the Federal Circuit's particular word choice for
analyzing equivalence,” it reiterated the application of its “function-way-

slippery and probably cannot be settled without some resort to arbitrariness. Presently, an element
seems to be more than just a single word, but potentially less than an entire step in a method or
an entire constituent part of an apparatus (as is typically demarcated by semicolons).”).
156
Michel, supra note 23, at 127 (“The Federal Circuit has struggled for a more precise
definition.”).
157
Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. United States ITC, 805 F.2d 1558, 1568–70 (Fed. Cir. 1986), reh'g
denied, 846 F.2d 1369 (Fed. Cir.1988).
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Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at 934–36.
159
Tex. Instruments Inc., 805 F.2d at 1572.
160
Douros, supra note 17, at 329.
161
Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. Am. Fur Ref. Co., 198 U.S. 399, 406 (1905) (“It is well settled that
a greater degree of liberality and a wider range of equivalents are permitted where the patent is of
a pioneer character than when the invention is simply an improvement, may be the last and
successful step, in the art theretofore partially developed by other inventors in the same field.”).
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Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1546.
163
Id.
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See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
165
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 40.
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result” test and left it to the Federal Circuit to “refine the formulation of the
test for equivalence in the orderly course of case-by-case determinations.”166
Third, courts must also conceptualize and compare each claimed element
and has nearly unfettered discretion in deciding how broadly or narrowly to
define each operative term.167 As Section II.C discusses, this discretion raises
the concern that incompetent and biased juries would reach erroneous and
potentially unreviewable results. It can be a dicey business for courts to avoid
aggregating two or more claimed elements into a single element, since the
latter impermissibly treats the “invention as a whole.”168
Construing construction is inherently ambiguous. Words cannot be
mapped nearly to inventions.169 Commentators noted that “courts define the
scope of legal rights not by reference to the invention but by reference to
semantic debates over the meaning of words chosen by lawyers.”170
Despite being based on factual evidence such as the patent’s prosecution
history and expert testimony, what the claims mean to a person of ordinary
skill in the art is a legal question. Once properly construed, applying the claims
to the accused device is a factual question: does the accused device fall within
the scope of the properly interpreted claim, either literally or under the
doctrine of equivalents? Infringement is a question of fact and jury verdicts of
infringement must be supported by substantial evidence.171 Patentees must
explain why a given element of the accused device is equivalent to the
corresponding claim limitation.172 Mere assertions will not suffice, and
conventional wisdom teaches that courts will “hastily” rule against patentees
in summary judgment motions if they fail to produce evidence establishing
equivalence.173 They need to isolate the proof for each element of the claim
and show juries “substantial identity” as to each of the function, way, and
result prongs of the doctrine.174 This takes the form of particularized testimony
and linked arguments to prevent the jury from being “put to sea without
guiding charts.”175 It also guards against juries determining infringement by
comparing the claimed invention and the accused device using an “overall
166

Id.
See Genentech Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[W]hether
the ‘way’ or ‘result’ prongs are met is highly dependent upon how broadly one defines the
‘function’ of [a claimed element.]”).
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Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1364.
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Burk & Lemley, supra note 63, at 1746.
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similarity” approach.176 Skepticism over the jury’s competence has marked
the doctrine’s history and would come to play a formative role in shaping its
present incarnation.
C. Incompetence
From the moment the doctrine was born, the judges who watched its
birth were concerned that the doctrine would substitute the judgement of the
Patent Office with the court’s view on the breadth of patent rights.177 That
concern continues to the present day with courts and commentators worrying
that the uncertainty and risk of false positives caused by the unruly doctrine
would be exacerbated by having juries apply it.178 Federal Circuit Judge Plager
even mooted declaring the doctrine of equivalents “a judge-made rule in the
first place—to have its roots firmly in equity, and to acknowledge that when
and in what circumstances it applies is a question of equitable law, a question
for which judges bear responsibility.”179
Part of the concern is one of competence. To determine patent
infringement, courts construe claims as a matter of law and juries then
compare the construed claims to the accused device.180 Juries must decide, as
a matter of fact, whether the accused device infringes the claims, either
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.181 The problem is that jurors
“frequently” have difficulty understanding legal jargon in complex
litigation,182 “and [are] easily misled by expert testimony”183 dealing with
“technologies at the forefront of innovation . . . where issues may hinge upon
legal and scientific concepts that even experts can have difficulty
understanding.”184 Biotechnology is an area where the doctrine may be
particularly difficult to apply. This is because of the
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178
See Folker, supra note 14, at 225 (“The confusion surrounding the doctrine of equivalents,
which results in its unpredictability in application, is compounded by permitting juries — as
opposed to judges or technical experts — to make the determination of whether a device infringes
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complex panoply of nucleotide sequences, proteins, antibodies,
engineered cell lines, vaccines, and viruses that constitute the current
array of biologic pharmaceuticals, a class of therapies that will almost
certainly become more numerous and complex in the future. The
analysis is further complicated by the fact that simple changes, even
single changes at the DNA or protein level, can lead to drastic
consequences for the biologic in question.185
No less than three Federal Circuit judges argued that determining equivalence
by jury is “operationally unsatisfactory and jurisprudentially unjustified.”186
In 1996 the Supreme Court held that judges could be entrusted to “give
a proper interpretation to such instruments patents than a jury; and he is,
therefore, more likely to be right, in performing such a duty, than a jury can
be expected to be.”187 Borrowing contract law as an analogy, a patent is a
contract between the patentee and government.188 Courts reform claims the
same way they would reform contractual terms when literal analysis fails to
produce a “fair” result.189 Further, because the doctrine involves issues of both
law and fact, a case may be made for judges to decide the legal issue alone.190
This “logic,” commentators say, “readily carries over to equivalency
analysis,”191 because juries lack “the necessary technical or legal
sophistication to make the fine-line determinations required by a doctrine of
equivalents analysis.”192 Incompetence in the face of complexity leads to the
second problem—bias.
Substitution bias is a well-known behavioral quirk which manifests
when people need to decide a complex issue and subconsciously substitutes a
more easily heuristic.193 Commentators raised the specter of juries favoring
patentees due to their high regard for the PTO and the patent system in general,
even though they understand little about the actual workings of either.194 Juries
asked to determine infringement as a matter of patent law may instead decide
which side they think is the “good guy.”195 In this regard, conventional
wisdom tells us jury bias favors patentees and may cause them to substitute
185
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substantiality for the notion that of the two devices, the patentee’s is better.
Juries tend to view the U.S. PTO and its scrutiny of patent applications with
high regard despite evidence indicating otherwise.196 The perception is that
the government has “at least validated that invention and honored the patentee
for her contribution to technological progress.”197
Juries also “tend to idealize inventors” as individuals with the “talent,
skills, and effort to invent something [that] has received the recognition of the
United States of America.”198 They may therefore rely on patentees’
investments to determine the “worthiness” of their cause or conversely, the
lack of alleged infringer’s investments in determining the “unworthiness” of
their defense against infringement.199 This notion is encouraged by the
Supreme Court’s suggestion, that absence of the alleged infringer’s research
investment gives rise to an inference of “practicing ‘a fraud on a patent.’ ”200
Juries instead may view infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
as whether the defendant was “wrong” in infringing the patent and should be
punished for “stealing” the patentee’s invention.201 Indeed, courts expressly
recognized evidence of copying as relevant evidence even though a technical,
rational reading of patent claims and prosecution history should strictly
speaking be the only determinants.202 The alleged infringer’s copying may
also be a proxy of its lack of investment. Conversely, where there is evidence
that the alleged infringer sought to design around the patented invention, the
doctrine of equivalents is less appropriate.
Infected by substitution bias, jurors “focus on the actions of the people
involved in a trial and not on specific exhibits (like models of the invention
and the accused device) or documents (like a claim chart).”203 This extraneous
evidence prevents juries from “mak[ing] the objective determination required
196
Reavill, supra note 11, at 366 (“[J]uries assume that an invention undergoes the highest level
of scrutiny before a patent issues.”). See also id. (“The PTO does make mistakes, and often the
patents-in-suit lack the degree of integrity that jurors attribute to them.”).
197
Id.
198
Id. (“Such a person may inspire awe and therefore bias jurors in her favor.”).
199
Douros, supra note 17, at 340 (“The idea of incorporating research investment into the
determination of equivalency was intimated in Graver Tank.”).
200
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 618 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Id. at 612 (“[The trial court
could properly infer that the accused flux is the result of imitation rather than experimentation or
invention.”).
201
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases – An Empirical Peek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 393 (Nov. 2000) (“Juries may perceive the patentee who brings an
infringement action as a victim and an infringer accused of stealing patented technology, a villain.
To find willfulness, the factfinder must conclude that the infringer intentionally or flagrantly
disregarded the patentee's rights. The outcome data indicate that juries are more easily persuaded
than judges by ‘bad guy’ evidence.”).
202
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519 (asserting that evidence of copying is relevant to a determination
of equivalence).
203
Folker, supra note 14, at 226.
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in a doctrine of equivalents analysis,”204 and “improperly allowing the patent
holder to expand the patent protection by encouraging patent holders to initiate
(or threaten to initiate) abusive infringement lawsuits that not only cost the
defendants time, money, and aggravation, but may also serve to artificially
inflate license fees for patented technology.”205
In contrast, conventional wisdom teaches that judges have a comparative
advantage because “[f]ederal judges typically have decades of legal
experience before being appointed to the bench and are sensitive to the
meaning of legal words and phrases.”206 As the Federal Circuit itself noted,
“[u]nlike a jury in a district court case, the [International Trade] Commission
resolves disputes involving patent infringement matters with some regularity
and thus is aware of doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence.”207 Moreover,
“patent cases are concentrated in a relatively small number of districts, and
judges–unlike jurors–are often ‘repeat players’ in patent litigation.”208
Proponents of using juries regard their disparagement as “arrogant and
paternalistic.”209 Some have said “performing a function/way/result analysis
involves the same level of juror competence and discretion as gauging
ordinary negligence.”210 But if true, placing equivalents in the hands of jurors
incompetent to decide those issues may violate due process under the Fifth
Amendment.211
The other part of the problem stems from the legal system itself. Juries
must answer the question of patent infringement in a binary fashion—simply
a “yes” or “no”—with no opportunity to offer the basis for their
conclusions.212 On appeal, jury verdicts provide no meaningful way for the
Federal Circuit to assess whether “the jury understood the technology,
understood the law of patents and the policies that underlie it, understood the
function, way, and result of the matter, and arrived at a considered
decision.”213 Moreover, “because the reviewing court normally has little to go
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Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1538, n.3. (Plager, J., dissenting) (“[T]he reality is that the doctrine of
equivalents is a virtually uncontrolled and unreviewable license to juries to find infringement if
they so choose.”). See also Folker, supra note 14, at 226 (“[T]he broad manner in which responses
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by except for the final determination concerning infringement, there is
generally something somewhere in the record that the winning party can argue
is substantial enough to uphold the jury verdict.”214
The Federal Circuit’s ability to review the lower court’s decision is
further limited because infringement is a question of fact, reversible for
prejudicial error in the jury instructions or for lack of substantial evidence
supporting the verdict.215 In most cases, jury determinations will be upheld
“even if they did not actually understand the technology or if they performed
the doctrine of equivalents analysis improperly.”216 In describing judicial
frustration with the doctrine of equivalents, Judge Plager noted that “[f]ederal
district judges, perhaps understandably, by and large make little pretense of
liking these patent infringement cases, and are quite content to give them, and
all the issues in them, to juries to decide. The cases typically come to us on
appeal with nothing more than a general verdict finding infringement. There
is no explanation by the jury of the rationale behind their verdict, if any
exists.”217
The Supreme Court acknowledged “unreviewability” of “black-box jury
verdicts,” and suggested that “where the evidence is such that no reasonable
jury could determine two elements to be equivalent, district courts are obliged
to grant partial or complete summary judgments.”218 Conventional wisdom
notes that “more and more patent litigators attempt to avoid the jury ‘black
box’ by filing for summary judgment.”219 Previously both judge and jury had
a role in determining the outcome of a doctrine of equivalents case as “an issue
of fact to be submitted to the jury in a jury trial with proper instructions, and
to be decided by the judge in a bench trial.”220 However, the incoherence of
the doctrine combined with the risk that an incompetent, inscrutable, and
almost unreviewable jury verdict creates a rational incentive for judges to seek
to cabin it wherever they can. For if this unruly exception to infringement
swallowed the rule, the result could be disastrous.221 It would be up to the
judges to prevent this result, even if they had to do so through displacing the
jury’s function.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) provides that district courts may
grant a motion for a judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) “at any time before
the case is submitted to the jury” “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue
during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a
214

Folker, supra note 14, at 227.
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522.
216
Folker, supra note 14, at 227.
217
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1538 (Plager, J., dissenting).
218
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 39 n.8.
219
White, supra note 31, at 786.
220
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522, supplemented, 64 F.3d 675 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
221
See, e.g., Meurer & Nard, supra note 2.
215

252

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 36

legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”222
Following an earlier study, “a court’s decision to grant JMOL before verdict
at trial was classified as a judicial decision—because the judge determined
there was no willfulness—even though the rest of the issues in the case may
have been decided by a jury.”223
This begs the question of whether equivalence findings varied depending
on whether it was a bench or jury trial. The coding differentiated between
bench trials and those jury trials that also involved a JMOL by the patentee or
defendant. Figures 1 and 2 below show both types of trials strongly favor the
defendant. They appear to mirror each other, both in terms of relative wins
and the trends over time. The fact that there is no discernible difference
between bench trials and jury trials shows that whatever concern there might
have been to incompetent juries may have little factual basis.

Figure 1: Bench Trial

222
223

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
Seaman, supra note 182, at 445.
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Figure 2: Bench & Jury Trial (Outcome)
Conventional wisdom thus teaches that less successful patentees
invoking the doctrine after Markman hearings became important.224 Earlier
studies do indeed bear this finding out. The Allison-Lemley study found
patentees had a relatively low win rate of twenty-four percent of cases
compared to overall win rates of fifty-eight percent.225 This result tracks
conventional wisdom that “summary judgment is now the most likely method
of disposition for patent cases.”226
Patentees won 33.5% of the cases involving the function-way-result test,
and 29.5% of the cases involving the insubstantial differences test.227 Within
those numbers, more than two-thirds of the wins simply involved defeating a
defendant’s motion for summary judgment rather than winning on the
merits.228 Patentees won on the merits less than ten percent of cases.229 The
Allison-Lemley study indicates that by the late 1990s, patentees almost never
prevailed at trial or on appeal.230

224

Id. at 977–98.
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 966 (“This finding is robust across each of the three
datasets—patentees won 27.6% of the cases before Festo, 21.7% of the cases in the mid-Festo
period, and 22.2% post-Festo.”).
226
White, supra note 31, at 751.
227
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 967, 975.
228
Id. at 967 (“While a significant victory, it is hardly the same as actually winning the case on
equivalents grounds.”).
229
Id.
230
Id. at 970–71.
225
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D. Irrelevance
The move to peripheral claiming has disadvantaged patentees in two
important ways. First, peripheral claiming enabled clever defendants to
interpret claim terms so as to render them invalid or not infringed. Professors
Lemley and Burk noted that
[i]f a defendant makes ten such claim-construction arguments, the
patentee may have to win every one in order for the claim to survive. So
the more terms a court construes, the more bites at the apple defendants
get. And because claim drafting is, as we have seen, inherently
imprecise, any one mistake can be fatal.231
Second, the doctrine of equivalents is effectively a form of central claiming.
Here, Professors Burk and Lemley explain that the doctrine “asks whether the
accused device appropriates the ‘gist’ of the literal claims by adopting a
substitution known in the art.”232 However, in an age of peripheral claiming,
“[c]ourts are aware that the text of the claims is supposed to represent the
outermost boundaries of the inventor's rights, and they are anxious not to
expand the claims through the doctrine of equivalents.”233 As a result, this
“leads to expansion of the patent claims under the rubric of literal
interpretation; rather than finding infringement by equivalents, interpretive
sleight of hand is used to stretch the claims text to cover similar accused
devices.”234
Earlier empirical studies indicate that courts applied it consistently until
between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s. 235 The Allison-Lemley study was less
sanguine, reporting that “[t]he doctrine of equivalents was largely dead by
1998.”236 The cause of its purported death was the Supreme Court’s 1996
decision that claim interpretation, or a Markman hearing, as it would be called,
was an issue for the judge, not the jury.237 The study premised this shift on the
technical complexity of modern claims which judges were better suited to
handle. Claim construction could also be determined based on records
developed during summary judgment briefings which was again the province

231

Burk & Lemley, supra note 63, at 1763.
Id.
Id.
234
Id.
235
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958 (2007); Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2, at
1378–79 (2010); Lee Petherbridge, The Claim Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 215, 233 (2008) [hereinafter Petherbridge, Claim Construction Effect].
236
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 976–78.
237
Markman, 517 U.S. at 390–91. See also Schwartz, supra note 2 at 1179 (“[T]he displacement
of the doctrine of equivalents, which led to its decreasing importance, occurred after Markman I,
well before any direct assaults on the doctrine in these cases.”).
232
233
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for the judge, not the jury.238 Literal infringement became the rule and the
doctrine became its exception.239
The effect has been a substantial reduction in cases where the doctrine
applied.240 Post-Markman, the Federal Circuit would discuss it “in the same
breath as claim construction.”241
The reasoning is as follows: the doctrine of equivalents and claim
construction both determine patent scope. Claim construction demarcates its
literal reach. The doctrine of equivalents stretches that notional limit where
differences between the literal claim scope and the accused product are
insubstantial. 242 Claim construction is relatively easier to use and reduces the
unpredictability of jury trials by shifting the determination to judges.
Moreover, once judges have ruled on claim construction, they want to resolve
the entire dispute since judges constructing claims know the accused products’
structures.243 This allows them to settle on a broader construction to avoid
having the jury contend with the doctrine.244
Markman caused district court judges to grant summary judgment of
non-infringement245 since judges “will be doubly inclined to hold for the
accused infringer” to dispose of the case.246 As the Federal Circuit put it

238
See, e.g., SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“After
discovery the court expects the parties to refine the disputed issues and learn more about the claim
terms and technology, at which point a more accurate claim construction can be attempted.”).
239
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 978.
240
Daniel H. Shulman & Donald W. Rupert, “Vitiating” the Doctrine of Equivalents: A New
Patent Law Doctrine, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 457, 459 (2003) (“These other decisions, which have
become more and more frequent in the last few years, limit the DOE by effectively creating a per
se rule as to what constitutes an equivalent.”). In 2001, the Federal Circuit continued narrowing
the reach of the doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit en banc eliminated the doctrine of
equivalents for a different type of claim element—no equivalents are available for subject matter
disclosed in a patent specification but not literally claimed. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., 285
F.3d at 1046. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1203 (the Federal Circuit often discussed the doctrine of
equivalents in robust detail). Id. at 1204 (noting that claim construction appears in less than fifty
percent of appellate decisions pre-Markman, increasing to seventy percent of decisions by 2000
while the doctrine declined).
241
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1203.
242
See e.g. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958; Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2,
at 1378–79 (2010).
243
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958.
244
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1181 (“[C]ourts may have found these doctrines to be substitutes
for each other”; “claim construction has arguably expanded to encompass the doctrine of
equivalents.”); Id. (“[J]udges quickly decided the doctrine of equivalents under the guise of
summary judgment to keep the case from the jury.”); Id. at 1182 (“Judges who held separate
hearings may have been more likely to learn the technology and have a greater desire to dispose
of the case in its entirety after claim construction.”); Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958
(“That dataset bears out our hypothesis. The doctrine of equivalents was alive and well before
Markman but has been in decline ever since.”).
245
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 977.
246
Id.
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“[w]here the parties do not dispute any relevant facts regarding the accused
product . . . but disagree over possible claim interpretations, the question of
literal infringement collapses into claim construction and is amenable to
summary judgment.”247
Claim construction, however, is just one means by which judges took
control of the doctrine. Another means of doing so is by granting summary
judgment based on one or more of the judicial limits set on the doctrine such
as prosecution history estoppel.248 This is because “[j]udges have wide latitude
in almost any patent suit to foreclose the doctrine of equivalents as a matter of
law, thus preventing juries from applying the doctrine of equivalents to find
infringement” through tests like “function-way-result” and limits like
prosecution history estoppel.249
The Petherbridge study observed that “the decline of the doctrine is the
natural evolution of judicial efforts to emphasize the policy that the public
should have reliable notice of the scope of a patentee’s right to exclude.”250 It
noted that “while the courts were killing the doctrine of equivalents, patent
applicants were increasing the rate at which they filed applications for new
inventions,” leading them to conclude “that innovators might not need the
encouragement of the doctrine of equivalents to innovate and disclose,”251 or
“pushed innovators to invent and disclose more, perhaps to ensure that
commercial innovations (which may embody many inventions) find adequate
protection.”252 Moreover, patentees are suing on more patents, suggesting
patents remain valuable despite its decline.253
The Allison-Lemley study reported 413 equivalents cases between 1999
and 2005, giving an average of 91.8 cases per year.254 The Article reports 316
cases over ten years between 2009 and 2018, giving an average of 31.6 cases
a year. This precipitous drop of two-thirds shows the parties are far less likely
to assert the doctrine than they were a decade ago. Figures 3 and 4 below show
the breakdown over each of the ten years. Other than a spike in 2010, the
number of district court cases has remained both consistently and markedly
lower. The graph presenting Federal Circuit cases shows that 2010 district
247

General Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
See Paul, supra note 37, at 248 (“This discretion can operate through several mechanisms,
including function-way-result analysis, prosecution history estoppel, and the all-elements rule.
Judges can also foreclose the doctrine of equivalents through their application of other areas of
patent law, such as claim construction.”).
249
Paul, supra note 37, at 248.
250
Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2, at 1404.
251
Id.
252
Id. at n.97.
253
See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135
(2009) (documenting the increase in patent litigation intensity); Petherbridge, On the Decline,
supra note 2, at 1405.
254
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 980.
248
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court spike percolating upwards starting in 2011 and 2012, before leveling off
through 2015 and declining sharply thereafter. While lower than before, the
doctrine remains alive and a trap for the unwary. What role do equitable
triggers and limitations to the doctrine play in courts applying the doctrine
today? These are discussed next in Parts II and III.

Figure 3: District Court Cases (Over Time)

Figure 4: Federal Circuit Court Cases (Over Time)
II.

EQUITABLE TRIGGERS

Known as “equitable triggers,” evidence of copying, independent
development, and the pioneer status of the invention, may affect how liberally
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or narrowly courts apply the doctrine of equivalents. Courts and commentators
agree that the doctrine seeks to ensure patentees get fair protection in their
claims, there is less consensus on what extent “equitable” principles animate
the doctrine.255 As a policy lever for courts to achieve a fair outcome for
patentees, one might think the doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine
like the contract law doctrine of promissory estoppel.256 They could be
forgiven for doing so.
Courts have noted that the doctrine is “designed to do equity” and “to
relieve an inventor from a semantic strait jacket.”257 In its own jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court focused on both the inventor’s merit and the defendants’
bad motives.258 The law, was, and remains, vague about the nature and extent
“merit” and “bad motives” played, and when they outweigh the need to
provide the public clear notice of the patent’s scope.
The jurisprudence, however, seems to tilt toward a general notion of fair
play rather than judges being empowered to intervene when the strict legal
result causes injustice.259 First, courts have no discretion to invoke the doctrine
to remedy a seemingly unjust result.260 In contrast, patentees may generally do
so whether or not they show any merit in an equitable sense.261 Second, judges
never employed the doctrine independently of juries.262 Indeed, the Supreme
Court forbade a “judicial exploration of the equities of a case before allowing
application of the doctrine of equivalents.”263 At the same time, as seen in Part
255

Moorhead, supra note 26, at 1428 (noting that “the doctrine of equivalents is an equitable
doctrine.”). But see Reavill, supra note 11, at 320 (“Recent debate, however, has questioned the
way in which the doctrine approaches the principles of equity.”); see also Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d
at 1539–43 (Plager, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen there is a wrong for which there is no adequate
remedy at law, equity courts have traditionally gone beyond the law to impose a just and equitable
result. Thus in those special cases in which the competitor's product is literally different but the
difference is so insubstantial as to constitute a ‘fraud on the patent,’ a court in the exercise of its
extraordinary equity power may extend the remedy of infringement in order to protect the rights
of the patentee granted by law.”). See also id. at 1545 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
doctrine's weighing various factors is an equitable determination for a judge.).
256
See Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678 (1984).
257
Perkin–Elmer Corp., 822 F.2d at 1532.
258
Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1966.
259
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521 (“[I]n doctrine of equivalents cases, this court's allusions to
equity invoke equity in its broadest sense—equity as general fairness. While recognizing the
equity, or fairness, promoted by the doctrine of equivalents[.]”). Holbrook, supra note 52, at 5
(“The express purpose of [the doctrine of equivalents] is to ensure fair and adequate protection to
the patentee and to solidify the patent incentive.”).
260
Id. “By referring to the doctrine as a doctrine of fairness, neither the Supreme Court nor this
court has invoked the myriad implications of an alternative to legal remedies. In addition, neither
the Supreme Court nor this court has invoked equity in the technical sense of a set of principles
originating in England to compensate for the historically harsh rules of common law.” Hilton
Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521.
261
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521; Holbrook, supra note 52, at 5.
262
See id.
263
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 34.
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II, courts are generally uncomfortable with giving juries more leeway than
necessary to determine patent infringement.264 Some commentators have even
expressed discomfort with juries adjudicating even on the lesser “fair play”
interpretation of the doctrine.265
Third, intent generally plays little role in the doctrine’s application.
Infringement does not turn on defendants’ desire to infringe nor their
knowledge of the patent.266 Commentators have expressed that equitable
triggers like copying and design-arounds provides juries “with a facade behind
which it can factor in evidence of intent.”267
However, others have argued that intent may be the only distinction
between copying per se and copying to design around even though in both
instances, the differences may be equally insubstantial (or substantial) in a
technical sense. Copying steals the patented idea directly, and necessarily
requires intent.268 Evidence of copying may suggest that differences between
the claimed and accused device are insubstantial.269 Conversely, evidence of
defendants’ attempts to “design around” patented claims may be exculpatory
“because there is a presumption that one of ordinary skill in the art would
design substantial changes into the new product to avoid infringement.”270
Moreover, intent to copy and its absence were of substantial importance
to the Supreme Court. It taught that “[w]ithout some explanation or indication
that [the accused device] was developed by independent research, the trial
court could properly infer that the accused [device] is the result of imitation
rather than experimentation or invention.”271 That statement has not been
expressly overruled and cases continue to teach that intent remains an
important consideration, particularly where they take the form of copying,
designing around, pioneer inventions, and independent development.272
Defendants’ intent can thus help courts filter patentees who genuinely deserve
a second stab at proving infringement, and the doctrine loses both its equitable

264

Reavill, supra note 11, at 320 (indicating that “[d]iscontent with the focus of equivalency
analysis, and especially with the roles that juries and intent play in that analysis, has divided the
patent community.”).
265
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1178 ( “a fairness doctrine juries apply, is arguably inconsistent with
a patent system premised on predictability and on clear prior notice of the scope of rights.”).
266
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 35 (stating that “[a]pplication of the doctrine of equivalents,
therefore, is akin to determining literal infringement, and neither requires proof of intent.”).
267
Reavill, supra note 11, at 357.
268
See e.g. Keith A. Robb, Note, Hilton Davis and the Doctrine of Equivalents—An Insubstantial
Difference, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 275, 282 (1996).
269
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519.
270
Folker, supra note 14, at 218.
271
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 612.
272
Reavill, supra note 11, at 355–56.
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nature and its justification.273 For instance, if copying were the sole basis for
invoking the doctrine, it would prevent it from “becoming the second prong
of every patent infringement charge.”274 The better view then is that intent,
like any other probative evidence, should go to the weight and not to
admissibility.
Of the 316 cases in the dataset, most (72.7%) did not mention equity in
any form (Figure 5). Of the cases that did, those that found for patentees and
defendants were about evenly split (Figure 6), with 45.3% finding for
patentees and 51.1% finding for infringers. This suggests that the equitable
nature of the case as such did not dominate the outcome of cases in the dataset.
Similarly, of the 27.2% that discussed equitable triggers, half found for the
defendant, and the other half for the patentee (Figure 7). Any correlation is
therefore equivocal at best. Within each type of equitable trigger, however,
patentees did best with copying (60.0%) compared with design-around and
independent inventions (40.0%). Over time, both copying and designarounds/independent invention were present and took turns to dominate as the
most common equitable trigger (Figure 8). There was only one case that
discussed pioneer inventions and no meaningful conclusion can be drawn
there except that those cases are exceedingly rare.

Figure 5: Prominence of DOE as an Equitable Doctrine

273
Id. at 358 (“Consideration of intent should take into account whether the accused device is the
result of independent development (involving no copying), copying in order to design around the
patented device (involving a constructive employment of copying and respect for the patent
system), or copying in order to pirate the patented device (involving a subversive employment of
copying in an effort to circumvent the patent system).”).
274
Moorhead, supra note 26, at 1447.
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Figure 7: Outcome (By Equitable Triggers)
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Figure 8: Equitable Triggers (Over Time)
A. Copying
The Supreme Court intended the doctrine to protect patentees from
“piracy,” “fraud,” and “stealing.”275 Evidence of copying suggested that the
differences were insubstantial.276 The doctrine tolerates copying as an
intermediate step to designing around the patent.277 However the defendant
must ensure that the new device does more than just narrowly escape the
claim.278 Rather, the necessary difference approximates what defendants show
to avoid infringement.279 One empirical study found most infringers did not
copy the patented invention and some even did not have knowledge of the
patent. This suggests that courts’ use of claim construction coupled with literal
infringement was the better basis for reflecting the reality of this “no-fault”
infringement.280

275

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 612 (Black, J., dissenting).
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519.
277
Id. at 1520.
278
See Paul N. Katz, The Doctrine of Equivalents and Its Impact on “Designing Around,” 4 FED.
CIR. B.J. 315, 315–16, 320–21 (1994).
279
Robb, supra note 268, at 282.
280
See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19 (2008).
276
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The issue of copying was most prominent in 2009, with patentees
sweeping all wins that year (Figure 9). Patentees won 63.6% of cases
involving copying. Overall, copying has not been prominent, comprising 7.9%
of all cases compared with design-arounds (9.49%), and surpassing only the
pioneer invention cases (0.6%). It appears that rivalry plays an important role
in copying cases, with patentees twice as likely to win against a rival than
against a non-rival (Figure 10).

Figure 9: Outcome Over Time (Copying Only)

Figure 10: Whether defendant’s identity as rival affected outcome (Copying
only)
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One reason for the connection between outcomes for rivals versus nonrivals may be the “known interchangeability” factor. Supreme Court
jurisprudence teaches that an “important factor” to consider in any equivalents
analysis is “whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known
of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one
that was.”281 Where “known interchangeability” was an issue in the case,
patentees prevailed 43.5% of the time (Figure 11), which is significantly
higher than the average patentee win rate in doctrine of equivalents cases
studied (32.6%).

Figure 11: “Known Interchangeability” (Outcome)
B. Design-Arounds & Independent Invention
Leapfrogging is the basis for design-arounds and independent invention
being exculpatory factors courts consider when looking into the substantiality
of differences.282 Rivals may consciously attempt to avoid the patented
invention to advance the state-of-the-art and fuel the kind of dynamic
competition that characterizes the patent system.283 Independent development
occurs when rivals produce their devices without knowledge or notice of the
patented device.284 The Supreme Court regards both favorably, with the
former creating a suggestion that the differences may in fact be substantial.285

281

Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1532 (Newman, J., concurring) (“If minor improvements are likely
to be captured by the doctrine of equivalents, this might cause the would-be competitor to move
to diverging areas instead of simply tagging along at the periphery of the patentee’s claims.)”; see
also id. at 1532-33 (Newman, J., concurring) (encouraging “leapfrogging” advances as opposed
to substantial imitation).
283
Id. at 1520.
284
See Robb, supra note 268, at 282.
285
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520 (noting that designing around will affect the substantiality of
differences while independent development will have no such effect).
282
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However, since independent does not exonerate invention infringement,
commentators guess that the exculpation was dictated by the doctrine’s
purpose of discouraging “theft.”286 Conversely, the absence of independent
research meant courts could “infer that the accused flux is the result of
imitation rather than experimentation or invention.”287 Like copying,
patentees were very successful in 2009 before dipping precipitously in 2010
and never really recovered relative to defendants (Figure 12).

Figure 12: Outcome Over Time (Design-Around Independent Invention
Only)
Figure 12 shows that patentees do comparatively better than defendants
in cases involving design-arounds and independent invention compared to
copying cases. Patentees win 40.0% of these cases here compared with
copying cases (63.2%) seen earlier. Within the design-arounds and
independent invention, however, the defendants performed consistently better
than patentees (40.0% for patentees compared to 60.0% for defendants).
Moreover, Figure 13 shows that the accused infringer, who was not a rival,
was significantly more likely to prevail against a patentee than if the parties
were rivals (75.0% versus 54.5%). This is consistent with the view that the
doctrine’s purpose is to protect the patentee from copyists, and not innovators.

286
Glitzenstein, supra note 16, at 289 (stating that “[t]here could have been no theft in fact if the
accused product was the fruit of independent research and development.”).
287
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 612.
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Figure 13: Whether defendant’s identity as rival affected outcome (DesignAround Independent Invention only)
C. Pioneer Inventions
Courts may look at whether the invention was a pioneer in its field. The
Supreme Court authorized the use of broad claiming language for pioneering
inventions that applied to later-arising technologies when courts apply the
doctrine of equivalents.288 “Pioneer status” depends on whether the invention
makes a significant technological advance in the field.289 If so, the invention
would in theory enjoy a broader range of equivalents than non-pioneer
inventions and because the invention inherently has greater potential
embodiment scope.290 This is because in a new field with little prior art, the
gap between the claimed invention and the prior art will be significant without
any expansion potentially ensnaring the prior art.291 This privilege may stem
from the principle that the inventor who has enabled a vast improvement in
the useful arts should be rewarded commensurately. In contrast, non-pioneer
inventions improve existing inventions, usually in a crowded field.292 Pioneer
288
See e.g. Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 207 (1894) (“If the invention is broad or
primary in its character, the range of equivalents will be correspondingly broad, under the liberal
construction which the courts give to such inventions.”); Perkin-Elmer Corp., 822 F.2d at 1532
(“A pioneer invention is entitled to a broad range of equivalents.”).
289
See Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561–62 (1898) (“To what
liberality of construction these claims are entitled depends to a certain extent upon the character
of the invention, and whether it is what is termed, in ordinary parlance a ‘pioneer.’ This word,
although used somewhat loosely, is commonly understood to denote a patent covering a function
never before performed, a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and importance as to mark
a distinct step in the progress of the art, as distinguished from a mere improvement or perfection
of what had gone before.”).
290
Computing Scale Co. v. Automatic Scale Co., 204 U.S. 609 (1907).
291
Tex. Instruments, Inc., 805 F.2d at 1572.
292
Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at 963.
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inventions are also often commercialized more slowly, so the doctrine “may
be socially desirable because it avoids high-cost refinement that might
otherwise occur.”293 Finally, pioneer status protects inventors “when the
invention is in a field that is changing rapidly in a way that creates high
refinement costs because of the high cost of predicting imitative strategies that
might be used by competitors.”294 The doctrine pegs patent scope to
technological advancement since equivalents are evaluated at the time of
infringement, not the time of invention, filing, or issuance.295
In practice, determining whether an invention deserved a “pioneer”
status was done on an ad hoc basis. Every invention was unique, diluting the
value of precedent.296 Even when a court accepted that the invention was a
pioneering one, determining an appropriate range of equivalents proved to be
another hurdle. Some judges treat pioneer inventors more generously,297 while
others rejected the contention that invention was a pioneer entitled to a broad
range of equivalents.298 This makes it difficult to design operable jury
instructions.299
Commentators have observed “[t]he role of the status of the invention in
doctrine of equivalents analysis is uncertain, if any role exists at all.”300 The
Federal Circuit has not uniformly addressed the issue. Some opinions are still
written under the principle that a pioneer invention is “entitled to a broad range
of equivalents.”301 Recent Federal Circuit decisions have downplayed that
benefit pioneer status brings to patentees invoking the doctrine.302 When the
293

Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1995.
Id.
295
See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 37 (1997) (“Insofar as the question under the doctrine
of equivalents is whether an accused element is equivalent to claimed element, the proper time
for evaluating equivalency--and thus knowledge of interchangeability between elements--is at the
time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued.”).
296
Ted Baker, Pioneers in Technology: A Proposed System for Classifying and Rewarding
Extraordinary Inventions, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 449 (2003).
297
Corning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at 1257–61. See also Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 2001
n.254 (“Critics of Corning read this case as ignoring the all-elements rule in favor of the holistic
approach to the [doctrine].”).
298
Universal Gym Equip. Inc. v. ERWA Exercise Equip. Ltd., 827 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
299
See Baker, supra note 296, at 453–54 (“Even the classification of an invention as a pioneer is
a challenge within the current system. The standards that serve as the basis for this classification
are inconsistent and vague.”); see also id. at 453 (“Perhaps the most logical approach is to define
‘substantially the same’ more liberally when the range of equivalents is expanded, but since the
jury has no way to know where the baseline for substantial similarity exists, a modification of that
baseline is likely to be meaningless.”).
300
Hofmann, Jr., supra note 140, at 1058.
301
Perkin-Elmer Corp., 822 F.2d at 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
302
See, e.g, Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1989). See
also Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 863 F.2d 855, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1068 (1989) (“It is not necessary, of course, that an inventor be entitled to a broad claim
294
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patentee’s assertion that its patent was a pioneering technology, the Federal
Circuit responded that classification was irrelevant to its infringement
analysis.303 The court explained that if earlier cases treated inventions at issue
differently, those differences stemmed from the sparseness of relevant prior
art rather than a “manifestation of a different legal standard based on an
abstract legal concept.”304 Trial courts have also disregarded the invention
pioneer status altogether, with one dismissing it as “ancient jurisprudence.”305
In looking at trends over time, cases involving design-arounds and
independent invention dominated the first two years, with cases involving
copying playing a significantly more prominent role between 2012 – 2018.
Despite having memorable policy justifications, cases involving pioneer
inventions were in fact rare, with only one case out of 316 over the 10-year
period. This shows that the prominence of a doctrine might not translate into
it being prominent in real life, validating the view by one commentator that
[t]he practical difficulties of classifying pioneer inventions and
providing them with expanded protection, combined with the Federal
Circuit's reluctance to apply a different standard to pioneer inventions,
leave little incentive for modern patent holders to argue for pioneer
status. Therefore, it is not surprising that the merits of patented
inventions are rarely assessed in modern case law.306
That revelation is one of many reasons why evidence-based studies are
valuable.
Means-plus-function claims allow patentees to describe devices whose
components could have many embodiments, by pointing to what the device
does and which covers all the similar structures.307 Literal infringement occurs
when the accused device has the same structure and performs the same
function recited in the limitation using the structure disclosed in the
specification.308 It allows courts to look at the allegedly infringing device to
see if its elements are equivalent to the patented structure, even if not identical.
For example, a claim may call for parts A and B to be secured, and that parts
A and B are made of wood secured by nails. An accused device that uses
screws or adhesive would perform the identical specified function and would
literally infringe as long as it performs exactly the same function.

covering all possible products in a line of products before a court may award an invention pioneer
status, or a range of equivalents sufficient to encompass a particular accused product.”).
303
Tex. Instruments, Inc., 846 F.2d at 1370.
304
Id.
305
Sun Studs, Inc., 872 F.2d at 987. See also Corning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at n.7.
306
Baker, supra note 296, at 454.
307
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2007).
308
Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
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In contrast, infringement under the doctrine includes equivalents not
detailed in the specification as well. However, it limits equivalence to
technologies developed after the patent is granted.309 This is because doctrines
like prosecution history estoppel and the public dedication doctrine prevent
patentees from asserting equivalence if it could have been included in the
patent, unless the element in the accused device is the result of a technological
advance. This is because that variant “may be developed after the patent is
granted . . . [and] based on after-developed technology, could not have been
disclosed in the patent.”310 Like other inquiries under the doctrine, the
applicable range also depends on “the pioneer or non-pioneer status of the
invention, the prosecution history and the prior art.”311
In the context of the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit read
Section 112(f) to impose a temporal restriction on the meaning and application
of functional claim terms, restricting them from after-arising technologies.312
Courts limit claims to structural technologies embodying the identically
claimed function known at the time of filing to perform the function and to be
equivalent to structural embodiments of that function disclosed in the
specification.313
The Allison-Lemley study found 18.2% of all cases involved the
“means-plus-function” claims.314 Patentees won in 5.3% cases, which they
attribute to “a smaller role for the doctrine of equivalents.”315 The dataset
reveals that 10.9% of all cases involved the “means-plus-function” claims, a
fall of about one-half. This may have been due to more patentees relying on
literal infringement rather than the doctrine. The dataset also reveals that
patentees won in 24.5% of the cases, perhaps reflecting that patentees are
choosing to invoke the doctrine in more meritorious cases (Figure 14).
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Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
311
D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
312
Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc., 145 F.3d at 1310 (“The doctrine of equivalents is
necessary because one cannot predict the future. Due to technological advances, a variant of an
invention may be developed after the patent is granted, and that variant may constitute so
insubstantial a change from what is claimed in the patent that it should be held to be an
infringement. Such a variant, based on after-developed technology, could not have been disclosed
in the patent. Even if such an element is found not to be a § 112, ¶ 6, equivalent because it is not
equivalent to the structure disclosed in the patent, this analysis should not foreclose it from being
an equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents.”).
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Al-Site Corp., 174 F.3d at 1320 (“[E]quivalent structure or act under § 112 cannot embrace
technology developed after the issuance of the patent because the literal meaning of a claim is
fixed upon its issuance. An 'after arising equivalent' infringes, if at all, under the doctrine of
equivalents.”).
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Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 975.
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Id. at 976.
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Figure 14: Outcome (Over Time, MPF claims only)
III.

LIMITATIONS

Courts erected four bars to the doctrine of equivalents: prosecution
history estoppel, the “all-elements” rule, the prior art bar, and the public
dedication rule.316 Like prosecution history estoppel, each penalizes patentees
“for sloppy or overly aggressive patent drafting and for strategic behaviors
that shift the cost of information about the legal scope of an invention from an
inventor to the Patent Office and the public.”317 Former Chief Judge Michel
remarked that “lawyers often overlook these potential bars.”318
Figure 15 shows the distribution of judicial limitations to the doctrine,
with prosecution history estoppel dominating (49.2%) of cases discussing
limitations, followed by the “all-elements” rule (31.5%), prior art bar (10.9%),
and public dedication rule (8.5%). About half of the cases did not mention any
limitations to the doctrine, which is surprising considering their prominence
in the literature but consistent with former Chief Judge Michael’s observation.
By comparison the Allison-Lemley study’s breakdown was as follows:
prosecution history estoppel (37.8%), the “all-elements” rule (36.6%), and the
public dedication rule (2.9%).319
316

MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 783 (5th ed. 2019).
Petherbridge, On the Development of Patent Law, supra note 93, at 927.
318
Michel, supra note 23, at 127.
319
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 982. Most cases do not distinguish between amendmentbased estoppel and argument-based estoppel in prosecution history estoppel cases. Neither does
the dataset. For a list of cases in the dataset discussing one or both these forms of estoppel, see
Pharma Tech Solutions Inc. v. LifeScan Inc., 348 F.Supp.3d 1076 (2018), Alfred E. Mann Found.
for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2015), Medtronic Navigation,
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Figure 16 shows the continued dominance of prosecution history
estoppel over time, with the “all-elements” rule surpassing it only briefly in
2013. The prior art bar and publication dedication bar have remained
consistently low over time.

Figure 15: Distribution of Limitations to DOE

Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersysteme GmbH, 603 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2010), LG
Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 798 F.Supp.2d 541 (2011), MarcTec, LLC v. Johnson
& Johnson, 638 F.Supp.2d 987 (2009), Paone v. Microsoft Corp., 881 F.Supp.2d 386 (2012),
Zircon Corp. v. Stanley Works, 713 F.Supp.2d 881 (2010), Intendis GMBH v. Glenmark
Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA, 822 F.3d 1355 (2016). This Article also treats “all-elements” and
claim vitiation cases identically for coding purposes. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S., at 39
n.8 (1997) (“Vitiation” is not an exception to the doctrine of equivalents, but instead a legal
determination that “the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could determine two elements to
be equivalent.”).
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Figure 16: DOE Limitations (Over Time)
The dataset showed that patentees fared best with the prior art bar
(51.9%) compared to the public dedication rule (38.1%), prosecution history
estoppel (36.9%) the “all-elements” rule (30.8%) (Figure 17). By comparison
the Allison-Lemley study’s breakdown was as follows: prosecution history
estoppel (26.9%), the public dedication rule (25.0%), and the “all-elements”
rule (17.9%).320 Compared with the 1999 – 2005 period, patentees in the 2009
– 2018 period fared better with the prior art bar, but worse in all other
categories. This result may have been due to the interaction of validity and
other doctrines, the precise correlation of which would be a rich subject for
future study.
As a question of law, these limitations enable judges to enter summary
judgments of non-infringement in favor of defendants, protecting them from
baseless patent infringement claims.321 The data reveals that summary
judgments did indeed dominate all other procedural postures (Figure 18).

320
321

Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 982.
Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1999.
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Figure 17: DOE Limitations (Outcome)

Figure 18: Procedural Posture (Outcome, “Not Mentioned” Filtered
Out)
A. Prosecution History Estoppel
Commentators call the Federal Circuit’s inability to articulate a
workable standard for prosecution history estoppel its “single largest
failing.”322 While the Supreme Court appeared to have settled on a position
favoring patentees, who have the opportunity to rebut a presumptive surrender
of claim scope, commentators noted that in reality, the burden “has been very
322

Strawbridge, McDonald & Moy, supra note 85, at 888–89.

274

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 36

difficult for patentees to overcome.”323 According to them, the key obstacle
patentees face is showing that the equivalent was “unforeseeable.”
Equivalents are “foreseeable” even if one of ordinary skill in the art would not
recognize that it was an equivalent or view it as acceptable for use in the
invention at the time the application is filed so long as the variant existed at
the time of the application.324 This requires patentees to “reach beyond
conventional knowledge when filing an application or amendment to
anticipate all potential uses of extant technologies that may be relevant to the
claimed invention.”325 The problem, as Judge Newman has argued, is that
patentees may not fully appreciate extant technology until a later date.326 One
commentator noted “[t]his in itself would be rare, and it would be rarer still
that the applicant, aware of such an alternative, would have failed to claim it
in the first instance. An alternative would be foreseeable only in the limited
circumstances where the alternative was inadvertently omitted and was a
candidate for a reissue patent.”327
The Article reported on outcomes over time. Figure 19 shows defendants
performing significantly better than patentees across the almost entire 10-year
period, with two notable peaks between 2009 – 2011, and 2014 – 2015.
Patentees finally managed to turn things around toward 2017 – 2018, but
whether they can sustain that trend remains to be seen.

323

Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1177.
Holbrook, supra note 52, at 23 (“The Federal Circuit has since made foreseeability an even
more stringent standard, rendering rebuttal of the Festo presumption effectively impossible unless
the asserted equivalent is solely the result of later-developed technology.”).
325
Id. at 24.
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Festo Corp., 493 F.3d at 1384 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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Figure 19: Outcome Over Time (PHE Only)
The Article also reported on the exceptions to the application of
prosecution history estoppel. Figure 20 reveals why patentees lost during those
years. It turns out that all three exceptions to prosecution history estoppel had
little to do with the outcome. Surprisingly, most of the cases did not even
discuss any of the exceptions. One explanation for this is that defendants
invoking the prosecution history estoppel during those periods simply
survived having their motions quashed by summary judgement. Indeed, the
graph showing a trend of procedural posture over time confirms this, with
summary judgments by defendants being the dominant procedural posture
over most of the period studied (Figure 21).

Figure 20: Outcome over time (PHE Exceptions)
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Figure 21: Posture over time (PHE Exceptions)
Two-thirds of the cases that discussed prosecution history estoppel did
not consider any of the exceptions (Figure 22). About a quarter (27.3%)
discussed tangentiality, only about a sixteenth (6.6%) discussed foreseeability,
and no cases discussed “some other reason.” Given that patentees routinely
amend claims to avoid prior art during prosecution, it is unsurprising that
tangentiality, a rebuttal mapped to precisely that activity, should dominate the
three exceptions to prosecution history estoppel. It is also unsurprising that
unforeseeability is rarely invoked to rebut prosecution history estoppel, since
as noted earlier, conventional wisdom already teaches that it is an uphill battle.
No other empirical study has reported on these results, so there is no basis for
intemporal comparison.

Figure 22: Outcome over time (PHE Exceptions)
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B. “All-elements” Rule
The Allison-Lemley study found patentees won 17.9% of the cases
involving the all-elements rule between 1999 – 2004.328 The Article reveals
that between 2009 – 2018 patentees won in 30.4% of cases, doing significantly
better in showing that every limitation of the patent was found on the accused
device. However, as with prosecution history estoppel, patentees generally
fared worse than defendants. Intriguingly the 2009 – 2011 peak for defendant
wins manifest again, with another peak in 2013 (Figure 23).

Figure 23: Outcome (Over Time, “all-elements” rule only)
C. Prior Art Bar
The prior art limits patentees to a scope that avoids prior art.329 The test
is whether the Patent Office would have allowed the equivalent in a
hypothetical claim over the prior art.330 It applies whether a single piece of
prior art anticipates the equivalent or whether one or more pieces of prior art
would together render that equivalent obvious.331 As with prosecution history

328

Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 975.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(“[A] patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents, coverage which he
could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal claims.”).
330
Id. at 684; Streamfeeder, LLC v. Sure-Feed Sys., 175 F.3d 974, 982 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (excluding
equivalents “obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art” at the time of invention).
331
Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (prior art would
make the accused product obvious).
329
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estoppel and the all-elements rule, the prior art rule is a legal question for the
trial judge, and reviewed de novo.332
While the Allison-Lemley study omitted the prior art bar inexplicably,
this study reports that patentees prevailed in 51.9% of cases, by far the best
among the limitations. One reason for this is that patent applicants must
navigate prior art arguments as a matter of course and are comparatively more
skilled at surviving defendant summary judgment motions seeking to stop
them from advancing their cause using the doctrine. Figure 24 shows that a
picture of patentee markedly higher wins over time compared with the earlier
two limitations to the doctrine, with patentee dominating at about half the
period studied, a result consistent with the percent-win figure.

Figure 24: Outcome (Over Time, Prior art rule only)
D. Public Dedication Rule
The Federal Circuit articulated the public dedication rule in 2002. It
teaches that “when a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject
matter, as in this case, this action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to
the public.”333 Like prosecution history estoppel, the rule protects public
reliance on patentees surrendering its patent scope during patent prosecution
either gratuitously or so that they would obtain the patents.334
The Patent Office does not look at equivalents of a claimed invention
when determining patentability, so narrow claims attract a more limited
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universe of potentially invalidating prior art.335 Thus if a patentee possessed a
variation of the claimed invention, or if a skilled person in the art would
understand that variation from the patent, then the patentee’s failure to claim
it would cause it to fall into the public domain.336 This rule discourages
patentees from filing broad disclosures and attempting to then circumvent
examination by presenting only narrow claims and resorting to the doctrine of
equivalents to capture the broader disclosure.
The Allison-Lemley study showed the public dedication rule played a
much more minor role compared to the other three limitations. It was raised
only twelve times, and the patentee won 25% of those cases.337 The Article
reports eighteen instances, with the patentee faring better, winning 38.1% of
those cases. As with prosecution history estoppel and the “all-elements” rule,
patentee wins rallied in the later period of the dataset (Figure 25).

Figure 25: Outcome (Over Time, Public Dedication rule only)
CONCLUSIONS
Patent law is designed to promote the progress of the “useful Arts.”338
The doctrine of equivalents achieves this constitutional end by providing both
effective protection to inventors and adequate notice to the public. It enhances
the scope of patent claims by giving courts flexibility to expand them at the
cost of undermining the notice function of patent claims. Over the past
century, few patent issues have been considered so often by the Supreme Court
335
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[public dedication] rule does not mean that any generic reference in a written specification
necessarily dedicates all members of that particular genus to the public. The disclosure must be
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as the doctrine of equivalents. Courts, patent attorneys, and legal scholars have
wrestled with operationalizing the doctrine of equivalents for nearly 150 years.
This Article provides both a doctrinal and an empirical basis for judges,
scholars, policymakers, and patent attorneys to better understand the
doctrine’s nature in order to contextualize its evolution and chart its future.
This Article also traces the doctrine’s origins and delves into the heart of its
policy tensions, including the reasons for the doctrine’s incoherence as well
as tension between judges and juries. Furthermore, this Article presents the
first empirical study on “equitable triggers” such as copying and pioneer
inventions and investigates limits such as prosecution history estoppel. In
doing so, this study contributes to evidence-based decision in patent law and
policy by filling a significant gap in the literature.

